The Clientelistic Effect of KBL (Kasal, Binyag, Libing) and other Financial Assistance Programs of Politicians to the Voting Behavior of the Poor

In a Selected Barangay in Metro Manila

A Thesis Paper

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This thesis entitled “Strings Attached: the Clientelistic Effect of KBL (Kasal, Binyag, Libing) and other Financial Assistance Programs of Politicians to the Voting Behavior of the Poor in a Selected Barangay in Metro Manila”, prepared and submitted by John Psalmuel Velarde Chan, is hereby accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the degree Bachelors of Arts in Political Science.

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Abstract

Free and fair elections are an integral part of a mature democracy, because this is one of the ways where the sovereign will of the people is expressed. It is where a venue for options and choices are given to voters. This research presents another problem to free and fair elections- the idea of politicians using discretionary soft projects to increase electoral support from the people, especially when the projects are directly attributable to the person of the politician. Soft projects in the form of financial assistance programs (free mass weddings and baptisms, medical, funeral and educational assistance) are hypothesized to create a feeling of indebtedness among the poor, which monopolize their decision-making process in voting.

This paper used both quantitative and qualitative methods of research to prove the existence of this form of clientelism in a barangay in Metro Manila, Philippines. Qualitative in-depth interviews and survey questionnaire were employed to get both the breadth and the depth of data. Four important dependent variables were looked at- recipient satisfaction, positive perception of politicians, the phenomenon of utang na loob or debt of gratitude, and the actual electoral support.

The research proved that voters who are subjected to such kinds of monetary or material grants from politicians are more likely to feel indebted to them, especially when they are poor and needy. Most of the time, these financial assistance programs will dominate the factors each voter uses in deciding who to vote. Utang na loob plays a huge role in the decision-making processes of voters, and this can be the cause of the implicit form of clientelism.
Acknowledgement

The thesis paper is not just an ordinary output. It’s not like the reaction paper our professors told us to write after listening to a symposium. It’s not like the essay we write during a midterm exam. The thesis paper is an extension of oneself, and one cannot simply finish a thesis paper without the people who have been there all the way.

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Chapter I

Introduction

Liberal-democratic countries have elections as one of their fundamental tenets. It allows the people to exercise their sovereign power and select officials who will spearhead the running of the day-to-day activities of the state. The success of elections depend on the amount of freedom people have in voting for their bets, and the assurance of a fair electoral procedure. However, in many parts of the world, elections can be problematic due to the existence of vote-buying, electoral fraud, etc. These things can hamper the ability of people to freely exercise their vote. Although government efforts to curb vote-buying and fraud are present, other forms of skirting proper electoral process can develop. For instance, is it possible for politicians to “buy” votes without going through illegal means? Specifically, this paper aims to prove the association between KBL (Kasal, Binyag, Libing) and other financial assistance programs like medical, disaster and educational aid, and the increased electoral support of recipients to them. Is it possible for the incumbents to hamper the ability of people, especially the poor, to vote freely through the delivery of assistance? In several places around the country, the culture of direct and personified distribution of social goods, in cash or in kind, is continually being perpetuated by incumbent politicians. This researcher aims to look at the politics of social good distribution, and how it can develop utang na loob among its recipients.

Research Question

Do and to what extent can KBL (Kasal, Binyag, Libing) and other Financial Assistance Programs of politicians affect the voting behavior of the poor?

Hypothesis

KBL and other financial assistance programs can be used by politicians to ensure the vote of recipients come election time because these programs heavily influence, if not monopolize, the decision-making processes of individuals when voting.
General Objective

To determine the effect of in-cash or in-kind financial assistance programs of politicians to the voting behavior of recipients during elections.

Specific Objectives

To be able to fulfill the general objective, several specific objectives have to be met:

1) To determine how beneficial KBL and other financial assistance programs are based on the perception of the poor;
2) To determine the general perception of recipients towards the overall performances of their respective politician-benefactors;
3) To determine the level of electoral support of recipients to their politician-benefactors
4) To determine how the receiving of financial assistance programs factor in the vote of recipients during elections;
5) To determine if the phenomenon of *utang na loob* is present in the transaction between politicians and their beneficiaries; and
6) To determine if a self-enforcing clientelism exists in recipients after receiving assistance.

Review of Related Literature

*Clientelism and distributive politics*

The main assumption of distributive politics is that parties and/or individuals in power are politically motivated in terms of the allocation of the national budget. In countries ruled by the elite, which is the case for the Philippines as stipulated by available literature, the interests of the ruling elite play into the distribution of the different goods and services of government (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2012). This is called elite capture. Social goods are a means to an end, which is to increase the chances of reelection of politicians and/or the proliferation of parties in power. This is why politicians engage in clientelism. In Bardhan & Mookherjee (2012), they defined clientelism as “the strategic transfers made by political parties and governments to the poor and disadvantaged groups as a means of securing their votes, in an effort to consolidate power.” Stokes (2011), simply
defined clientelism as the “giving of material goods in return for electoral support.” However, Stokes extended the supply-side definition of clientelism by saying that politicians select would-be recipients by asking them if the people will support them. This supposes that a form of filtering mechanism is present. As a consequence, it can be observed that an asymmetric, vertical relationship between politicians and recipients, because the power to distribute is vested to the incumbent officials. This is the skewed power dynamics in favor of the politicians is clearly seen even during the initial steps of clientelism, where patrons are still in the process of choosing potential clients. In a famous book on the politics of clientelism:

“Clientelism is a logic of exchange with asymmetric but mutually beneficial and open-ended transactions. It involves and voluntarism but also exploitation and domination (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 849).

It can be understood that clientelism is like an exchange of “favors” (De La O, 2012; Mares & Petrova, 2013; Green & Lawson, 2012) between politicians and beneficiaries. Although Kitschelt (2000) would argue that the favors exchanged are never equal, because politicians are able to get reelected by simply fulfilling their responsibility to distribute government funds. Nonetheless, in a clientelistic relationship, there will always be an exchange, regardless of the extent. Politicians distribute a certain type of social good to an individual, and an expectation of electoral support is observed. To facilitate this relationship, certain rules have to be existent (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). In their theory called the Social Exchange Theory, Cropanzano and Mitchell said that clientelism is a “bidirectional transaction” that requires something to be given and to be given back. It involves three things: 1) resources exchanged, 2) relationships that emerge after the exchange, and 3) rules and norms of exchange. For instance, in vote buying, the Social Exchange Theory can explain why it qualifies as clientelism. Firstly, there are resources exchanged, particularly the monetary grant given by politicians and the vote of people on the ground. Secondly, there is a clear relationship where the politicians server as the patron who has the power to choose his/her clients. Lastly, rules are present because politicians have to initiate the transaction and further impose checks and balances to ensure that voters actually vote for them. The theory assumes that explicit rules have to be present and implemented to ensure the proliferation of the relationship, which is why brokers or
intermediaries exist. Wang (no date) had an extensive analysis of how brokers, the intermediary between political parties and the people work to facilitate patron-client relationships. Brokers have to survey communities first and initiate contact with voters. After the granting of vote-buying money, they then have to create mechanisms to catapult their bosses to victory come election time. In Taiwan, where the Kuomintang (KMT) has been in power for decades, brokers have been crucial to ensure that the clients deliver their vote come election time. The processes people undergo in clientelism are explicit rules and norms of exchange. Bardhan & Mookherjee (2012) also stipulated that rules are necessary for clientelism to perpetuate. Therefore, it proposes that the proper imposition of the rules and norms of exchange is key to the reelection of incumbent governments. However, in this paper, the researcher aims to contribute to the literature on clientelism by asking: Are explicit rules necessary for clientelism to exist? Is it possible for implicit clientelism to exist even without enforcement from politicians and their brokers?

Dichotomy of clientelism

Perhaps the most famous and studied form of clientelism is what we call vote-buying, or the deliberate use of personal money and/or material gifts by politicians and/or political parties to purchase the votes of people on the ground. The literature on vote-buying is so rich, particularly because of the multitudes of studies conducted all around the world (Vicente, 2008; Hicken, 2006; Schaffer, 2005). Schaffer (2005) extensively studied the existence of vote-buying in the Philippines, even to the extent of providing pieces of hard evidence to prove that this type of clientelism indeed exists in the Philippines. Moreover, there is also an expansive research about the economic and politics implications, such as the loss of economic growth as a result of poorly voted government officials. However, vote-buying has already been declared illegal in almost all parts of the world because it distorts and blurs free and fair elections. It allows candidates who are rich to control the electoral results by using money. Because increasing government and civil society campaigns are quite successful in curbing vote-buying, is it possible that other forms of clientelism are more likely to intensify in gravity and magnitude? This is why in this paper, the researcher aims to look beyond the illegal forms of clientelism, and look at the possibility of its existence in the formal realm of governance. I use the model of distributive politics presented by Moser (2004) in his study of the electoral system of
Madagascar- that incumbent politicians strategically allocate goods to increase chances of reelection. To further understand this type of clientelism and to nuance it to Philippine politics, an in-depth study of the evolution of clientelism in the country has to be discussed in the next paragraph.

*Evolution of clientelism in the Philippines*

The literature on clientelism in the Philippines started in 1965, where a seminal work by Lande was published. The study of clientelism by Lande, However, was highly limited to the formal government structures. Historically, the political system of the Philippines is very similar to the American system. In order for national leaders to fully control the government, they had to establish mutually beneficial patron-client relationships with the officials i.e. senators, district representatives, governors mayors, among others (Lande, 1965). This was coined as the patron-client framework (pcf). In this type of clientelism, politicians engage in relationships that are mutually beneficial to them e.g. exchanging one’s soft projects to another’s hard projects or vice versa, promising votes for each other, and supporting each other’s bills. This is one of the reasons why the Pork Barrel system developed in the Philippines, where the President can freely distribute some portion of the national budget to members of the legislature, and subsequently from the legislative down to the local governments. In a historical research conducted by Tehankee (2012), and as initially stressed by Quimpo (2005), he noted that the clientelism was a concept inherited by the elite Filipinos from the Americans, particularly during the American colonization of the Philippines. This was exemplified by the Pork Barrel System, where inter-official patron-client relationships are done to entrench politicians in power.

The Philippine patronage system is heavily controlled by the elite, and is used by the elite for their own ends (Simbulan, 1965). This local manifestation aligns to the concept of elite capture by Bardhan & Mookherjee (2012) to prove that the elite has had the incentive to distribute the government budget to entrench themselves, or their relatives and/or allies in the political arena. It was also noted that party politics dominate the process of how the Pork Barrel is used, and it was observed that only allies are the ones that receive much of the pork allocation (Kawanaka, 2007). In the Philippines, this is true as members of the opposition, particularly the leftist Makabayan bloc did not regularly received Pork Barrel funds. Corroborating this with the conclusion made by Tehankee (2012), it can be noted
that the patron-client relationships in the Pork Barrel system also exist rampant in the United States Congress, where there is a “deliberate competition” between politicians to garner more Pork Barrel (Bickers, K. et al, 2007). This is called credit claiming. This allows politicians to spend more for their constituents and incentivizes them to enter patronage politics with each other.

However, several authors have moved away from the initial literature laid down by Lande and the others, and insisted that patronage doesn’t only occur in the formal structures of power (Noda, 2011). It can also exist in the normal day-to-day activities of people on the ground. In the Philippines, Hollnsteiner (1961) presented the three manifestations of patron-client relationship in the Filipino culture: 1) contractual reciprocity, 2) quasi-contractual reciprocity, and 3) *utang na loob* reciprocity. Contractual reciprocity involves a clear exchange between the giver and the receiver, where the item to be repaid by the receiver in future is clearly stipulated in either a written or unwritten contract. Quasi-contractual reciprocity involves the giver to give aid in exchange for a repayment, but the actual item to be repaid is not clear. I bring our focus to the third type of reciprocity which is based on *utang na loob*. To quote:

“Reciprocity usually takes the form of the same product or a different one but with the same value. The permanent superordinate-subordinate relationship is characterized by acceptance relative positions and a lack of corresponding lack of uneasiness on the part of the subordinate element about reciprocate with interest (Hollnsteiner, 1961).”

In this type of reciprocity, the giver does not explicitly define that a payment should be made by the receiver or in what way should the repayment be done. Nonetheless, the receiver still reciprocate an item of equal amount or something more expensive due to the feeling of *utang na loob*.

Aside from proving clientelism in layperson-layperson relationships, a methodological shift in the study of clientelism occurred, when researchers tried to bridge the formal to the informal, the government to the grassroots, to further expand the reach of distributive politics. This shows the trend of analyzing the dynamics between government and the masses, looking at how clientelism can exist between the two characters.
In another study by Hollnsteiner (1963), she characterized distributive politics in the Philippines as a “dyadic relationship” between politicians and the dependent poor. This paradigm shift led to a change in the study of clientelism in the country, from the patron-client framework (pcf) that exist in the formal structures of government and the newly developed clientelistic cluster networks (ccn) (Tehankee, 2012). In the United States of America, for instance, the dominant theory used to explain clientelism from the angle of politicians and individuals is the Core Voter Theory. Because the voting population in the US is highly defined by the ideological predisposition of individuals, political parties like the Republicans and the Democrats distribute funding to a strategic population. Cayeros et al. (2007) tested the theory in Mexico, and discovered that political parties tend to distribute more goods to the swing votes, because their consolidated supporters will always support for them regardless of the amount of allocation, and that the voters who are consolidated by opposing parties are hard to penetrate anyway. They went on to say that public goods are used to “buy votes” by virtue of these strategically-motivated allocations. Several authors moved away from this theory, which posits that politicians use ideology as basis of targeting allocations. There is also literature about how co-ethnicity between politicians and individuals is the dominant thrust in countries dominated by familial and tribal clientelism. Chandra (2007) put it frankly in a research about patronage-democracies:

“The theory of ethnic favoritism is based on limited information and the voter behavior of people in a patronage-democracy. A patronage-democracy is a state where people distribute resources in an individualized, discretionary basis. You help your own people from your position, in return your people will help you (Chandra, 2007).”

In this case, we can consider that the Philippines may show signs of being a patronage-democracy. Moreover, many authors say that politicians target poor communities and poor individuals, using short term goods to provide for individuals in the lower economic strata (Noda, 2011; Stokes, 2011; Weitz-Shapiro, nd; Scott, 1972). Berkeley, et al. (2011) even went as far as concluding that politicians deliberately avoid establishing clientelism with ideological, organized and informed voters because they are less vulnerable. Greene & Lawson (2012) agreed to this analysis by Berkeley by proving that civic-minded voters are able to see clientelisma as a bad, to reject offers, or to not use
received social goods as basis for their vote. This supposes that clientelism is more likely to proliferate in depressed communities, leading researchers to study different “pro-poor” policies of government from the perspective of distributive politics.

When we talk about vote-buying, the most famous form of clientelism, politicians have always targeted the most depressed communities (Vicente & Wantchekon, 2008). The politicians serve as the patron, who gives out monetary or material grants prior to the election, with the expectation or the intimidation that the voters (clients) will follow through with electoral support through the ballot come election time. But as I already implied, clientelism can also exist in legal institutions. Recently, a trend of studying poverty reduction programs such as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) has been started by researchers who want to prove the proliferation of clientelism inside budgetary allocations of government. Torres (2010) first studied the politics of CCT in different countries in Latin America, and concluded that pro-incumbent support rises with these transfers. She compared communities that are enrolled in CCT to communities that are not. Later on, another study in Mexico was conducted by the same author, and it was also proven that CCT resembled a form of clientelism where politicians exchange material favors (cash grants) in return for electoral support (De La O, 2012). Latip (2012) also asserted that the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) and the Philhealth Indigent Program (PIP) have been continually used by politicians to establish clientelistic relationships. In countries like Argentina, it was even proven that politicians have the power to choose who are included in the official list of beneficiaries of their social Welfare program, the Programa Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria (Weitz-Shapiro, nd).

Of course, aside from CCTs, the Pork Barrel can also been a potent tool for clientelism in different countries. In a very interesting macro-analysis of the allocation of Pork conducted by Punongbayan (2014), he discovered that Senators, who are free to allocate their pork anywhere in the country, focused their allocations in areas which relatively do not require such amounts of funding. This is an irony to the very reason why the Priority Development Assistance Fund was establish to begin with, because it was supposed to be for “priority” programs and projects as according to DBM Circular Memorandum about PDAF. Vote-rich provinces are observed to get the most allocations as compared to small provinces that might need more PDAF injections. To quote:
“Using poverty mapping, we see that pork releases (especially senatorial pork) tend to be concentrated in Luzon, in contrast to the stylized fact that development indicators are generally worse in the Visayas and Mindanao regions (Punongbayan, 2014).”

This data was backed up Noda (2011), when he posited that places with less population cannot demand for more budget allocation from Congressional Pork because of they’re not vote-rich.

All of these contributions to the literature prove that there is a motivation for politicians to engage in clientelism in different forms. To analyze, however, if these allocations are truly effective, this paper next analyzes the tendency of the poor to succumb to clientelism.

Voting behavior and effectiveness

In some forms of clientelism i.e. vote buying, intimidation and violence are the extreme ways of politicians to ensure that recipients of either illegal vote buying money or a social good fulfill their end of the bargain. For instance, in Taiwan, brokers are used to check if clients actually voted for candidates of the Kuomintang (Wang, nd). This is because clients do not always follow the deal entered by them and the vote-buying party. Mares & Petrova (2013) also the studied the existence of monitoring mechanisms in clientelistic relationships, and these would include bribes, harassment and intimidation. This literature shows that politicians truly have the intention and the actual attempt to secure the vote of individuals. This, however, doesn’t mean that all forms of monitoring are based on negative inducements. Other politicians would use positive incentives to ensure the delivery of the vote from individuals, such as additional benefits like food, clothing, and payment of utility bills, among others. These bribes are on top of the initial exchange between the politician and the voter to follow through the electoral support. As these clientelistic relationships continue, monitoring may be unnecessary in the long run because expectations of reciprocity can already be solidified (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007 as cited in Greene & Lawson, 2012). Cultural norms can make it easier for politicians to ease monitoring apparatuses, because the urge to reciprocate can ensure that individuals vote for their benefactor politicians.

Now that the idea of reciprocity, debt of gratitude, or in Filipino- *utang na loob* has been introduced, I try to build on the idea of clientelism without necessary monitoring
mechanisms. Greene & Lawson’s (2012) studied vote buying in different countries like Brazil, Mexico, Sao Tome e Principe, among others. They concluded that people self-enforce the deal between them and the politicians come election time. When politicians shy away from harassment and sanctions that may actually dissuade voters to accept money in exchange for their votes from the first place, voters are actually more likely to reciprocate through the ballot. Their analysis went on to say that negative inducements such as sanctions may create backlash instead of compliance. However, there is a gap as to answering what exactly persuades people on the ground to self-enforce the clientelistic deal. Other authors like Brusco, as cited by Stokes (2011) explained self-enforcement as a result of the fear of losing the benefits of the clientelistic relationship if they do not comply by virtue of the vote. Regardless if the politicians have the intention to use their discretionary power to remove benefits from people who might not fulfill their end of the bargain, this forward-looking fear makes voters vote for their patrons come election. There are also authors who explained self-enforcement as a function of the risk-averse nature of people, where they value the benefits they get in present than promises of better public policy in the future (Wantchekon, 2003; Desposato, 2007; Kitschelt, 2000; Scott, 1976 as cited by Stokes, 2011). These pieces of literature presently explain the middle analysis between clientelistic grants and increased electoral support.

In this research, I introduce the idea of utang na loob, as defined by Hollnsteiner (1961), which is the urge to repay something with the same product or another (such as a vote) of the same value, as a possible reason for self-enforcement. There are a lot of contributors to the literature on reciprocity that this value is a universal behavior in all countries (Berkeley, 2011; Cox, 2007; Sobel, 2005). Hahn (2004) and Smith (2008) are skeptical about the effectiveness of self-enforcing clientelism, because politicians can never know the level of compliance people are willing to make anyway. Pork barrel allocations towards communities, for instance, do not demonstrate a strong empirical evidence of a relationship with the increased voter support for the incumbent officials (Smith, 2008). In Hahn’s work entitled Reciprocity and Voting (2004):

“Experiments have provided evidence that people are not solely motivated by material payoffs, but also have a desire to reward the kindness of others and to punish behavior which is perceived as unkind.”
The findings of Hahn (2004) show that voter support for politician-benefactors is not an automatic. Nonetheless, the researcher hypothesizes that the chances of compliance nearly increases because of utang na loob, to the point where it overpowers other factors in voting.

In the literature about voting behaviors of people, 4 main theories of voting behavior have arisen (Berelson et al., nd). These are social orientation, candidate orientation, issue orientation, and party orientation). Social orientation refers to the tendency of people to vote for politicians of the same collective group e.g. religion, socioeconomic status, organization, etc. The second, candidate orientation, refers to the attachment of the individual to the politician. Thirdly, issue orientation proposes that people on the ground vote for politicians who believe on the same beliefs and aspirations of certain candidates. Lastly, party identification explains why certain individuals vote for candidates only because they are a member of the same political party. These factors are not mutually exclusive with each other. Although utang na loob clientelism is considered part of clientelistic orientation, it can also be considered part of candidate orientation, especially since financial assistance programs are personalistic and directly attributable to politicians. I borrow the Filipino psychological concept of utang na loob from Enriquez as cited by Marcelino & Pe-Pua (2000) which proposed that Filipinos feel the urge to reciprocate after receiving any form of help from anyone. However, based on the literature, the researcher predicts that utang na loob or the feeling of reciprocity will not, at all times, monopolize the decision-making processes of individuals in voting for their benefactors, but I hypothesize that it will play a large role. Assuming utang na loob exist, it can overpower other factors in voting like party orientation or issue orientation. To specifically know the top factors used by Filipinos in voting, we use the study by the the Institute for Political and Electoral Reform published in 1995. This study was re-conducted in 2003, and it concluded that the main factors of voting for Filipinos are popularity, beneficial projects and clean track records. This literature shall be useful in measuring how utang na loob as a result financial assistance programs play into the decision-making processes of individuals, given that other established factors are also used by Filipinos when they vote.

After reviewing and seeing the gaps in the existing literature, I then propose three contributions: 1) Clientelism can be self-reinforcing, even when no explicit deals have been
made between politicians and individuals on the ground. I ask the possibility of an implicit clientelistic relationship between the patron and the client, where patrons distribute social goods to voters without asking for something in return, yet still get the same reciprocation come election time, 2) Add to the existing literature on distributive politics by nuancing it to a more personal relationship between politicians and voters, especially when the goods distributed (which are attributed to the politicians) are close to the heart of the people e.g. free weddings, free baptism, funeral assistance, medical assistance, educational assistance, among others; and 3) Lastly, that utang na loob, a value strongly adhered by the Filipinos, plays a big role in facilitating this new type of clientelism the researcher proposes.
Theoretical Framework

I start this research using the critical paradigm, where it is acknowledged that reality based on the eyes of individuals is a result of political, economic, gendered and cultural forces, and that the people are enslaved by this taken-for-granted reality. Several versions of reality are taken as a given by people, especially if people see them as a normal part of daily life. The researcher considers implicit clientelism as a norm, since it is a legal and legitimate policy of the government and/or government officials to employ. Financial Assistance Programs, whether in cash or in kind, such as the KBL (Kasal, Binyag, Libing), medical assistance, disaster relief, educational scholarships, among others, are helpful and are seen as positive by the poor. However, if proven to exist, it can be seen that this clientelistic relationship between politicians and their beneficiaries as dyadic, asymmetric relationship that is skewed towards the benefit of the elite. In principle, this patron-client relationship can be a form of vote-buying. Only that, as according to Mares & Petrova (2013), the resources that are used to invoke this kind of clientelism are the coffers of the state.

The theory of elite capture and clientelism by Bardhan & Mookherjee (2012) will be used as the main theory of explaining the incentive of incumbent politicians to use government funds to increased voter support for the next election. Elite capture supposes that governments ruled by the elite, which is the case in the Philippines, decide the allocation of resources only for their long-term benefits. Obviously, this is in the form of
perpetuating their hold of key government positions so that they can protect their interests. This explains why politicians use government funding to try to elicit a clientelistic relationship with the vulnerable poor. Material benefits, in cash or in kind, are distributed to the people on the ground in the hopes of securing their votes in the future. This vertical, dyadic relationship is dominated by the politicians, who have the power to decide the recipients of the social goods.

To further explain why poor individuals are likely to participate in this implicit form of clientelism, I use the theory presented by Greene & Lawson (2012). This theory tries to prove that monitoring mechanisms like harassment, intimidation, violence, use of brokers, etc. are not necessary to ensure that voters fulfill their end of the bargain. This theory is crucial to the researcher’s theoretical framework, since the researcher is trying to prove implicit clientelism- a type of patron-client relationship where no explicit deals about the exchange are declared by the politician, yet the same effect of being able to get the vote of the beneficiary is observed. According to this theory, the feeling of the urge to reciprocate is the main reason why individuals do vote for certain politicians. For example, after a monetary transaction has been made between a politician’s broker and a voter, voters who feel the need to reciprocate will self-enforce the deal upon themselves. This theory helps shed light to explaining how individuals can be victimized even without the presence of a strict sanction by politicians.

In explaining why individuals choose to vote for politicians, I hypothesize that *utang na loob*, or debt of gratitude, dominates, if not monopolize, the decision-making processes of voters after the receipt of such material/monetary assistance from politicians. *Utang na loob*, which is a theory in Filipino psychology, is used by the researcher to link financial assistance programs to increased voter support to politicians.

This type of relationship where politicians can garner increased electoral support through using government funds is a manifestation of the patron-client system. It shows a relationship where one is powerful to dictate the course of the mindset of the other, while the other is victimized by the power dynamics behind the transaction.
In local politics, incumbent officials in both the executive and the legislative have the prerogative to distribute a certain part of the local government budget towards soft projects such as KBL (kasal, binyag, libing), medical assistance, disaster relief, educational assistance, and direct cash grants. KBL is a term used by government critics to represent direct soft projects used by politicians to establish themselves in the communities and attempt to increase voter support come election time. Other terms used are Kasalang Bayan (free mass weddings), Binyagang Bayan (free baptismal), libreng kabaong (free coffins), etc. These things have one thing in common: the delivery of all these services are attributed to local politicians e.g. governors, mayors, representatives, barangay captains, councilors, etc. They are different from services directly offered by government agencies tasked for a specific responsibility e.g. the Department of Health and its hospitals for healthcare, the Department of Education and the schools under it for educational assistance, etc. This major difference begs an analysis of the political effects of the direct, personified service rendered by politicians, because services from departments and bureaus are not directly attributable to any one person.
The prerogative to deliver soft projects is not incumbent to local government politics. In fact, this roots from the now unconstitutional Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). This PDAF, which was named the Countrywide Development Fund before, allowed Senators and Representatives in Congress to choose where some portion of the government budget will go, and which part of the population can receive this portion of government budget. According to the Department of Budget Management (DBM) Circular on the Release of PDAF, P200 million is allotted to Senators and P70 million is allotted to Representatives per annum. This budget can be used by these officials to hard (infrastructure, classrooms, roads, among others) and soft (medical assistance, scholarships, among others) projects. The PDAF has been declared unconstitutional in November 2013, although many organizations would say that the system is still existent even until the present (Social Watch Philippines, 2015).

Nonetheless, the local government has still been able to release pork-life funds that can be used for soft projects like KBL and other financial assistance programs. Since these programs come directly from the office of the politicians and not from the government institutions, the projects are highly attributable to the office. The inspiration of the study starts from this premise- because these services are direct and personified, people on the ground will always attribute the delivery of services to the politician whose office released the budget for a particular soft project. This is the independent variable. The researcher aims to look at how these financial assistance programs can establish an implicit clientelistic relationship between politicians and individuals. Emphasis is given to the modifier “implicit” because in practice, politicians don’t explicitly tell their constituents to vote for them in exchange for the material benefits they give as opposed to vote buying and explicit patronage politics. Nonetheless, this paper predicts that the same results i.e. increased voter support because of the direct and personified assistance program will be achieved by politicians.

To prove that clientelism indeed exists, I use variables that altogether indicate clientelism from individuals. I use 4 variables: 1) the satisfaction from the program, 2) positive perception towards the politician-benefactors, 3) the actual vote and the large influence of the assistance received to the decision to vote, and 4) the existence of the phenomenon of utang na loob. The researcher aims to prove the existence of all these
variables, and to trace the existence of these variables to the assistance program politicians provide them.

The satisfaction of recipients is one of the variables we seek to study since this can be one of the first indicators of a clientelistic relationship. Based from the review of related literature, the fact that the poor see the financial assistance from their patrons as huge help incentivizes them to reciprocate (Hollnsteiner, 1961; Greene & Lawson, 2012). To operationalize this variable, the questions aim to look at the perceived impact of the help to their lives and the recipients’ general stance towards the continuity of these short term programs.

The second dependent variable is the perception of individuals towards their politician-benefactors. This is necessary as a rough indicator of the possibility of incumbent support. As De La O (2012) puts it, voters develop a positive image from politicians who can attribute government-funded social goods, and as a result increase support for the incumbent. This will be measured by asking individuals how they rate the overall performance of their politician-benefactors, and their general perception towards the politicians.

The third and fourth dependent variables are more crucial for the research, as these variables will determine whether clientelism really does exist. The level of electoral support is a given, because the only way for the researcher to know if the voters really reciprocate to the assistance they received is if they really voted for their benefactors. However, to be specific, the researcher also has to weigh the strength of financial assistance programs to the decision-making processes of voters.

Lastly, we look at utang na loob as a variable, since this gives more nuance in proving the connection between the receipt of the financial assistance and the actual vote of people. The researcher aims to ask this directly in order to get hard data regarding the existence of this phenomenon.
**Definition of Terms**

1) *Utang na loob* (debt of gratitude)
   a. Conceptual- the feeling of the sense of urgency to reciprocate or give back to someone who recently gave you
   b. Operational- the feeling of indebtedness to vote for a politician whom have helped an individual

2) Clientelism
   a. Conceptual- an implicit relationship where, after the release of financial aid from the PDAF of a particular congressman, the recipient actually voted for that person as a result of “*utang na loob*”
   b. Operational- the increased support of recipients to their politician-benefactors even without an explicit transaction primarily because of the assistance.

3) Financial assistance programs
   a. Conceptual- social goods delivered by government to the people
   b. Operational- short-term assistance delivered by politicians directly to the poor. This includes KBL, medical assistance, scholarships, grocery, disaster relief, cash grants, among others.

4) Electoral support
   a. Conceptual- the actual vote of an individual towards a politician
   b. Operational- the actual or willingness of an individual to vote for politician-benefactor in an election immediately succeeding the delivery of the financial assistance
Methodology

This study is a cross-sectional research. The researcher aims to look at the effect of financial assistance programs to the voting behavior of the poor in an election immediately succeeding their receipt of the service. I also try to take a snapshot of the willingness to vote of recipients who are unable to participate in the election/s succeeding their receipt of a particular assistance program from any politician. To analyze the both the breadth and the depth of this phenomenon, the researcher will both employ quantitative and qualitative methods of social science research. The triangulation method will be used to marry the attempt to discover both the commonality between respondents as regards to the proliferation of an implicit form of clientelism and the life story of several subjects regarding the matter.

The main tool for the research will be the survey questionnaire. The researcher will employ this tool primarily for its ability to discover general rules that exist within a population. As per recommendation of a people’s organization- Youth for Nationalism and Democracy (YND), the shortlist of possible cities to research on was composed of Malabon, Navotas and Paranaque, where close ties between politicians and voters have been observed. YND has been active in community organizing, and has a long advocacy against patronage politics in the country. Their knowledge about different communities helped the researcher zero in on communities that show signs of the culture of KBL. The researcher handpicked Paranaque as the main research site given the availability of a local community organizations willing to aid the research endeavor, the Ugnayan ng mga Manggagawa sa Sun Valley (Ugnayan). More so, the city of Paranaque is also known to be a place where politicians are adamant in delivering short-term social goods to people e.g. Kasalang Bayan, Binyagang Bayan, among others. Hence, Barangay Sun Valley, where the Ugnayan organizes, became the planned research site of the researcher. Sun Valley is a large barangay in Paranaque (see appendix for a map of the barangay), composed of a lot of households that are frequently visited by the staff of different incumbent politicians from the Paranaque Local Government Unit. This is initially confirmed by the leadership of the Ugnayan ng mga Manggagawa sa Sun Valley, which usually serves as the medium of communication between local government officials and its members in certain societal
issues. As per their recommendation, most of residents in Sun Valley have been aided by politicians through these short-term financial assistance programs in one way or another.

Initially, the researcher planned to conduct a survey among relatives of or recipients of medical assistance programs from the Priority Development Assistance Fund in different hospitals e.g. the Philippine General Hospital, East Avenue Medical Center, National Kidney and Transplant Institute and the Philippine Heart Center. The PDAF, in fact, received a large budget allocation for discretionary soft projects of members of Congress. However, upon meeting with the different Directors/Administrators of the hospital, they advised that this type of approach will be tenuous since PDAF is already unconstitutional. Upon the initial inquiry of the researcher, there is indeed a decrease of medical patients who are recipients of the PDAF of Representatives and Senators in Congress. The researcher decided to change the site to the community and explore other type of soft projects that can elicit the same type of clientelistic relationship. Hence, instead of a study on soft projects delivered through the PDAF, the research focused on local distribution of social goods that have the same discretionary nature.

Given that the exact number of recipients of financial assistance programs in Paranaque, or in the country for that matter, is not determinable, the researcher was unable to calculate the sample size from a known sample population. Efforts have been exerted to ask for a sampling frame from the local government offices, but to no avail. Online sources are also unavailable, since no official count is present as to the number of recipients of KBL and other financial assistance programs of politicians locally. The sample population consists of all recipients of financial assistance programs, whether in cash or in kind, in Barangay Sun Valley, and the sample size was calculated using the formula for calculating the sample size from an unknown sample population:

\[ n = \frac{(Z_{a/2})^2(p)(1-p)}{e^2} \]

- \( n \) = sample size
- \( Z \) = \( Z \)-value of the confidence interval
- \( p \) = probability of getting a good sample
- \( e \) = margin of error

The confidence level is set at 90% reliability, which gives us an \( e=0.1 \) (10%) margin of error. The value of \( Z_{a/2} \) at 90% reliability is 1.645. I also set \( p=0.50 \) as the probability of
getting a good sample, as it is the standard in statistics. The researcher was unable to find known literature about the exact known value of the probability of getting a good sample as regards to research about clientelism, so I stick with the standard 50% chance. Putting all of those values in the abovementioned equation, the calculated sample population is 67.65. Rounding it off to the nearest whole number, the final sample size is at 68 respondents.

The researcher will use the randomized sampling method, going from house to house and asking the citizens if they meet the necessary criteria to be included in the sample size. The researcher used the following inclusion criteria: 1) the individual has to be at least 18 years old, the age required to be eligible for voting in any local, provincial and/or national elections; 2) the individual has to be a recipient of any financial assistance program from any politician defined provided by the researcher, or he/she must be a relative of the recipient of an assistance program. Initially, the researcher planned to exclude recipients of financial assistance programs who have not participated in an election right after their receipt of the aid because there would be no way of determining whether or not the individual voter for the politician-benefactor. However, upon finalizing the research framework, the researcher realized that aside from asking whether or not an actual vote has been given, I can also ask the recipients of their willingness to vote for the politician-benefactor after receiving the financial assistance program. This is for individuals who are either not registered but are eligible to vote or individuals who are registered but weren’t able to vote, and individuals who voted for their politician-benefactors prior to the receipt of the service. Asking individuals of their willingness to vote for their politician-benefactors, assuming that elections transpired on the day of the survey, allows the researcher to still see the clientelistic relationship even though no actual vote was cast yet.

Of course, if the respondent was able to vote in an election after he/she received the financial assistance, the politician must have also run for reelection or a higher position. If the politician-benefactor did not re-run, then the researcher resorts to measure only the willingness of an individual to vote for the politician assuming he/she ran. Nonetheless, the researcher is able to formulate a way to measure clientelism regardless if the voters were able to vote or not, or the politician ran for reelection or not. From these criteria I derive two exclusion criteria: 1) relatives who never had a hand in the process of requesting
for the services of the politician or have insufficient knowledge of their family member’s
transaction with a politician; 2) recipients of financial assistance programs or relatives of
recipients of financial aid from private individuals or official agencies of government e.g.
DSWD, DOH, DepEd, among others. For the clientelistic relationship to be directly
attributable to a politician, the financial assistance program has to be facilitated by his/her
office through his/her staff.

The qualitative method of research will be mainly used to explain why or why not
individuals vote for their politician-benefactors after the receipt of any financial assistance
programs. After establishing the commonality between respondents in Barangay Sun
Valley, the researcher also wants to look at the life stories of a few individuals who have
received aid from the PDAF. This will help the researcher get the depth that quantitative
research lacks by getting some insights from several individuals. In-depth subject
interviews will be conducted to get data from recipients of financial assistance programs.
The duration of which will depend on how long subjects are available, and the length of
their answers to the question of the researcher. Furthermore, the researcher will also
conduct expert interviews with several individuals who are knowledgeable about
discretionary funds to know more about the process of allocating them to government
offices, and how they can establish the clientelistic relationship that the researcher aims to
prove. Non-governmental organizations and incumbent politicians can provide important
information pertaining to soft projects and financial assistance programs of politicians in
general.

To start off with the research design, the researcher conducted a pilot study amongst
a few recipients of medical assistance programs, preferably the ones who are in the
Philippine General Hospital. The pilot study will help the researcher edit the survey
questionnaires and the interview guide. Prior to the implementation of the final data
collection tools, the researcher was able to interview two recipients of medical assistance
of politicians who undergo maintenance check-ups at the Philippine General Hospital.
After the interviews, the researcher added some questions to both the survey and the
interview guide to make them more understandable. The data gathered from the pilot study
was also used by the researcher for the qualitative part of the research.
In the course of surveying individuals in communities, the researcher will ensure that Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of individuals are secured. Two pages of FPIC documents are handed out to possible respondents and subjects prior to the survey or the interview. The first page is an Informed Consent Brief which is given to respondents. It includes all the information about the research, the rights of the respondents/subjects, and the contact information of the researcher. The second page is the Informed Consent Form (ICF), where both the researcher and the respondent, or for cases where respondent is unable to write, the relative of the respondent who witness the expression of consent of his/her family member, affix their respective signatures. The survey questionnaire was designed to allow respondents to answer it easily on their own, given that the questionnaire is no more than two pages long. However, in the event that the respondent prefers the researcher to administer the survey in a question and answer format, the researcher will adjust in the field. I plan to use frequency tables for quantitative data to show the results. Descriptive statistics with the aid of graphs and tables will be employed to ease the presentation of the data. Moreover, higher statistical tools such as the Chi-square test of independence, Chi-square goodness of fit for single variables, and the Logistic Regression Model will be used to deepen the quantitative analysis of the data. The Chi-square test of independence will be used to measure the association between categorical questions, and the Pearson’s Phi and the Cramer’s V will be tools used for determining the weight of association. For 2x2 Chi-square tables which have categories with frequency less than five, the researcher plans to use the Fisher’s Exact Test to see if there is a significance leading to the rejection of the null hypotheses for the tests of independence. This is a necessary alternative if the basic assumption of chi-square is violated. The Chi-square Goodness of Fit will be used to look at whether some choices for a single variable i.e. factors of voting are significantly different than the other options. Lastly, Logistic Regression will be employed to see how several ordinal and categorical data affect the tendency of individuals to answer a yes instead of a no in a categorical question. Primarily, the Statistical Program for the Social Sciences will be used to encode and analyze these data.

For the qualitative in-depth interviews, the researcher will organize all the answers given by the subjects in a table, where codes are used to represent their answers in a summarized format. Textual analysis will be used to analyze the data, mainly to give
insights to the answers derived from the survey conducted. Hopefully, qualitative interviews will be able to explain both the positive and the negative cases of the quantitative data, which will be helpful for the depth of the research. Interviews will not be recorded without the permission of the subjects, and extensive note-taking will be used to ensure that answers are recorded properly by the researcher.

**Scope and Limitation of the Study**

This research is able to analyze clientelism in different types of financial assistance programs e.g. KBL, medical assistance, educational scholarships, disaster relief, cash grants, etc. This is beyond the conventional stereotype that clientelism is always about vote buying and explicit deals between politicians and their beneficiaries. The relationship between politicians and their recipients can be clearly concluded by the researcher, assuming the data produce positive results. However, since this is a study limited to only one semester, several limitations arise: 1) The researcher is unable to find the exact source and amount of the budget used by offices of incumbent politicians to fund these clientelistic financial assistance programs because government offices are unresponsive despite persistence by the researcher; 2) The researcher is unable to conduct a probability sampling with the use of the draw lots method because of the unavailability of a sampling frame; 3) no comparison between income classes and their propensity to participate in clientelism is made because the research is focused on the poor; 4) the study is limited to the association of the receipt of the financial assistance program to the actual vote for politician-benefactors. It is unable to compare this group of the population to the non-recipients; 5) the researcher will not be able to discover entirely whether individuals are consciously or unconsciously participating in the clientelistic relationships; 6) No interview/survey has been conducted with politicians who participate in these clientelistic relationships, which could be the key to analyzing their psyche too, and 7) The researcher assumes that vote buying does not exist in the area, which can be an intervening variable to the decision-making processes of individuals.
Significance of the Study

This study contributes to the literature on clientelism not only in the Philippines but also to the academe. In general, many have already been published about clientelism in vote buying, or other government policy programs such as credit claiming in the United States, or the Conditional Cash Transfer in Latin American countries, but the study offers a more localized, personalistic view on clientelism. Moreover, since it is a study conducted in the Philippines, other nuances such as the phenomenon of *utang na loob*, a concept unique to the Filipino, is included in the analysis of the researcher. Moreover, the literature on politician-to-voter clientelism in the Philippines is still scarce, so I hope to make a contribution and start the trend of studying local politics and elite domination using government funding.

As for the societal relevance of this study, the critical perspective on distributive politics allows for a critique of the taken for granted reality that is direct and personified financial assistance programs by politicians. The researcher would like to make a case against discretionary funds as a whole since it can skew the advantage towards incumbent politicians who can distribute government funding to their electoral bases and secure reelections. If I can propose to transfer all of these services to localized government agencies like the DSWD, DepEd, DOH, among others, then the poor won’t have to be consciously/unconsciously reciprocate.
Chapter II

Data Presentation

After implementing the research protocol, the researcher was able to conduct subject interviews with three individuals, surveys with 68 respondents, and expert interviews with 2 key-informants, namely former *Kabataan* Party-list Raymond “Mong” Palatino and Social Watch Philippines. The following will be a presentation of the data acquired by the researcher, before an extensive presentation is made in the Data Analysis Section.

*Survey Questionnaire Results*

68 respondents from Barangay Sun Valley, Paranaque City are randomly selected by the researcher to participate in the survey. More females are surveyed than males because the fathers are usually the breadwinner in the households. According to the female respondents, their husbands are usually out for work so they’re unavailable. The researcher tried to administer the survey during weekdays and weekends, but due to the nature of the work of families, males still go out of the house for work even during weekends. Hereunder is the socio-demographic profiles of the respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-demographic Profiles of Respondents (n=68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-30</td>
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<tr>
<td>31-50</td>
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<tr>
<td>51-up</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income (in Peso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,001-10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001-15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last year of voting in an election</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have not voted yet</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Socio-demographic profiles of survey respondents

85% of the respondents (n=68) are females, and 10 out of 68 are males. Many of the respondents are on their middle ages (ages 31-50), but substantial respondents from the young adults and the elderly are present too. The upper limit of the group in terms of age is 76, while the youngest is 19 years old. The mean age is 38 years old.

In terms of monthly income, it can be seen that most of the respondents belong to a family of minimum-wage earners. Usually, only fathers work for the family because mothers have to take care of their children, and 54% earn between P5,001 to P10,000 a month. Most of the respondents belong to the lower economic strata, as there are only 4% of the respondents who earn more than P15,000 per month. This means that 96% earn less than P15,000 per month. Researcher has surveyed a family who earns P0 per month and only rely on aid from relatives and donations, while the highest income recorded for 1 family is P40,000 per month. The mean income is about P8,907 pesos, which is well
below the range of minimum-wage earners. Based from the Department of Labor and Employment, as of 2014, the minimum wage in the National Capital Region is P 466 for non-agricultural work, and P 429 for agricultural, service-based, and manufacturing work. If we assume that individuals work 30 days per month, minimum-wage earnings per month in the National Capital Region should be at P 12,870 to P 13,980. This means that on average, the earnings of the respondents is lower than the minimum wage, which is the threshold to determine whether a family will be able to sustain the cost of living allowance in a particular area.

About 68% of the respondents have attained some level of secondary education but did not step into college, divided amongst high school non-graduates (35%) and graduates (33%). Only 1 respondent was able to graduate college. The rest is distributed into elementary non-graduates (7.3%) and graduates (7.3%), and those who are able to reach college but did not graduate (12%).

96% of the respondents have voted at some time in their lives, but not all of the 96% have voted in an election immediately succeeding their receipt of the financial assistance program. This is why the researcher employed two different questions. For those who have been able to vote in an election immediately succeeding their receipt of financial assistance programs, they are asked “Did you vote for the politician that delivered the service.” For those who were not able to vote in an election immediately succeeding their receipt of the assistance and the 4% who haven’t experienced voting yet, the question used was “Assuming the elections happened today, and the politician who helped you ran for the same position or a higher position, would you vote for him/her?” Nonetheless, all are of voting age.

For the next part of the data presentation, I look at other descriptive data relevant to the research. I’ll look at the types of aid received by the voters, the offices responsible for the delivery of services, and the politicians who are named by the individuals:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of Help Received</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kasal (mass weddings)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Assistance</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief Goods/Grocery</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libing (funeral assistance)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binyag (baptism)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Assistance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (in-cash)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Kinds of assistance received by respondents (n=68)

KBL assistance programs comprise 56% of the financial assistance programs handed out by politicians. Usually, Kasalang Bayan and Binyagang Bayan (free weddings and free baptisms) are delivered in kind by politicians, and involve no monetary grant to the individuals. Funeral assistance, however, would range from free coffins, tents, land lots to cash grants for relatives of recipients who passed away. The researcher also observed that free weddings are frequently being held by politicians, usually most active on February 14 of every year. Medical and Relief assistance also range from monetary to in kind. According to 18% of the respondents who received medical assistance, some politicians give direct cash grants ranging from P5,000 to P40,000, or issue recommendation letters worth a certain amount of money, which can be used in hospitals that accept such recommendation letters. Relief assistance is delivered by politicians post-disaster, which is in the form of grocery packages delivered to their households. Only a few 2% are recipients of educational scholarships for college, and 7% have received direct cash grants for no specific allocation.

Looking at the offices involved in the distribution of these financial assistance programs, all are from the local governments. Both the executive and the legislative are active in the delivery of these grants, and the District Representatives are identified the most by individuals (53%). The office of the Mayor has also delivered any form of service to 38% or 26 of the respondents. About 9% of the respondents have received aid from their City or Municipal Councilors (3%), or their Barangay officials (6%).
I follow-up the previous graph about the offices involved with the actual names of politicians who delivered financial assistance programs to the sample size. The offices of the mayor and the representatives show four names of politicians who occupied the position for the past two terms. Hereunder is the horizontal bar graph:

Table 3. Identified Names of Politician-benefactors in Percent (n=68)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of politicians</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Gus Tambunting</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor Florencio Bernabe</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Roilo Golez</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor Edwin Olivarez</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on the table 3, it can be seen that Congressman Gus Tambunting, the incumbent Representative of the 2nd district of Paranaque, leads the list by being identified by the 40% of the respondents. Upon further research by the researcher, I discovered that Cong. Tambunting was the former Vice Mayor of Paranaque, and has been actively holding *Kasalang Bayan* (free weddings) for the poor ever since he was in the executive department of government. Mayor Edwin Olivarez, the current mayor of Paranaque, was also identified by 12% of the individuals. Non-incumbents Mayor Florencio “Jun” Bernabe, who was the mayor in of Paranaque from 2004-2013, and Roilo Golez, who was the district representative of the 2nd district of Paranaque prior to the incumbency of Gus Tambunting, were also named. Both Golez and Bernabe did not run for any electoral spot in 2013 because the constitutional limit of three terms for their respective positions. The others (7%) are names of barangay captains and councilors.

If I compare the graph concerning the names of the politicians with the previous graph pertaining to the offices involved, there are very slight discrepancies in the correspondence of the frequencies. For instance, in the graph about the offices involved, 53% of the respondents said that their aid was from an office of a representative. However, if I juxtapose it to the total percentage of Cong. Tambunting and Cong. Golez based on table 3 (which is 56%), I get a discrepancy of 3%. This is perhaps because some respondents mistaken the names of politicians to the wrong office, or vice versa. Nonetheless, the researcher reported the data accomplished by the respondents as is.

I now present data relevant to the conceptual framework and the objectives of the researcher. The first variable I looked at is the level of satisfaction individuals feel as a result of the in-cash or in-kind services they received from politicians. I operationalized this looking at two indicators. Firstly, how big was the help, regardless if given in cash or in kind received from the perception of the poor? Secondly, would recipients want to continue these kinds of short term financial assistance programs of politicians? For the first question, I use a Likert Scale divided into five categories ranging from *Napakalaking tulong* (the program helped so much) to *Walang naitulong* (the program didn’t help at all).
Figure 5. Perceived Impact of the Assistance from Politicians (n=68)

Based from the graph, it can be observed that 34 or half of the respondents said that the program assistance they got is a huge help for their families, and about 35% would say that they benefited so much from the short term assistance they got from the politicians. If I combine both the “napakalaking tulong” and the “malaking tulong” categories, it would comprise 85% of the sample size. Only 15% of the respondents said that the program helped them by only a little. In fact, no respondent plotted their answer on the lower categories of the scale, namely “maliit na tulong” and “halos walang naitulong.”

Respondents have also shown very positive results as regards to their stance towards these kinds of financial assistance programs. When asked if they would want to continue the program under which they are able to receive assistance, 99% said that the program should continue in the future. Only one out of the 68 respondents said that the program should not be continued in the future. Conclusively for the first variable, I can see that recipients of financial assistance programs develop at positive satisfaction from these short term programs, regardless if they’re delivered in cash or in kind by politicians.
The next thing I look at is the overall perception of recipients towards how politicians fulfill their responsibility as government officials. This variable is important to note how the image of the politician from the point-of-view of recipients can be influenced by the personified programs they deliver. Two questions are used by the researcher to operationalize this indicator. Firstly, respondents were asked to score the politician’s overall performance in terms of his/her job description. The ranking ranges from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most positive and 1 being the most negative in the scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Politicians’ Overall Performance Score from the Recipients’ Perception (n=68)

Secondly, I ask the respondents if they see the politician more negatively than positively or the reverse. If they answer yes in the previous question, the researcher asked a follow-up question, “Do you think that your positive perception towards the politician was affected by your receiving of the financial assistance program?” In this part of the questionnaire, the study aimed to see the overall image of politicians who engage in
delivering these kinds of financial assistance programs. An attempt to connect the receipt of the assistance program to the positive perception of respondents towards their politician-benefactor is also made. This is because I recognized that many factors may play into the projection of the public image of a politician.

Results show that 46% of the respondents scored their respective politician-benefactors with a grade of 5, the highest among the ordinal scale used by the researcher. Only 9% of the recipients are willing to give a score of 2 and below, which means that politicians who deliver these services are seen as responsible by the recipients. The upper end of the spectrum would add up to 67%, or 45 respondents out of 68 gave their benefactors a score of 4 to 5. I move on to the next question related to the politician’s image, and positive results are also seen. 60 of the respondents said that they see their benefactor politicians more positively than negatively, and only 8 said that they have a negative perception.

The two previous questions indicated that politicians are more likely to be seen as responsible and positively by their beneficiaries, and to connect this with the in-cash or in-kind support they receive, 61 of the respondents admitted that their receipt of the financial assistance programs affected their perception towards the politicians. Only 7 respondents, roughly the same as the number of respondents who see their politician-benefactors negatively, said that their receipt of the assistance did not influence them to see politicians more positively.
Leading to the most important variable in this research study, the researcher had to ask individuals whether or not they are able to vote in an election after they received the assistance program from a politician. 80% of the respondents are able to vote, and about 14 (20%) are unable to participate in an election succeeding their receipt of financial assistance programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Vote</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nakaboto ako noong tumakbo ang politiko</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi ako nakaboto</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Respondents’ who are Able to Vote Post-receipt of Assistance (n=68)

For those who are able to answer yes, the researcher asked the respondents whether or not they gave their vote to their politician-benefactors, and I see very positive results. From the 54 who answered that they were able to vote, 100% said that they voted for the politician who delivered assistance to them. To make use of the 20% of the respondents who are not able to vote in an election immediately succeeding their receipt of any form of assistance, I use a different line of questioning, “assuming today was the election, and the politician who delivered the financial assistance program ran for reelection or a higher public office, would you vote for him/her?” This looks at the willingness of individuals to vote but not an actual vote that was cast before. Out of those 14, 11 said that they were willing to vote for their politician-benefactor, and only 3 expressed a no. If I aggregate those who are able to cast a vote and those who were not, I have a total number of 65 respondents who are either willing or have cast a vote for their respective benefactors, and 4% of the sample size unwilling to give their votes to their politician-benefactor. This means that 96% fall into the yes category.
To determine whether the financial assistance programs have got anything to do with the actual vote/willingness to vote of recipients, a follow-up question was asked to them: “How did your receiving of the financial assistance program affect your decision to vote for the politician?” This is where the questionnaire offered another five-point Likert Scale with labels ranging from the answer “it was the only factor I used when I voted” to “my being a recipient did not affect my vote”. Almost half of the respondents said that the financial assistance they received was a huge factor in their respective votes, with 44% or 30 respondents out of the 68. 20% said the contrary and stressed that their receipt of the financial assistance program did not have a weight in their decision in voting for the politician. There is also a substantial number (28%) of respondents who reported that the financial assistance program they received was the only factor they used when they voted for their politician-benefactor. In aggregate, the table below shows that financial assistance programs played a role in the decision-making processes of 80% of the respondents, albeit in different extents. This ordinal data roughly presents the weight given by the voters to the financial assistance they received when they decided to vote for their politician-benefactor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weight of factor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindi ko ito ginamit bilang salik</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maliit ang naging papel nito sa aking boto</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katamtaman lang ang naging papel nito</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaki ang naging papel nito</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ito ang tanging salik na ginamit ko</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Gravity of Assistance Received as a factor in the vote (n=68)

To further verify the role of in-kind and in-cash financial assistance programs to the voting behavior of the respondents, the survey also asked them to check all that factors that they used when decided to vote for their politician-benefactor. I provided a shortlist of usual factors used by Filipinos when voting for politicians, which I sourced from (Institute for Political and Electoral Reform, 2003). These include fame of politician, clean track records free of corruption, known projects and programs, and clientelistic identification. I also included an “others” category to ensure that factors not considered in the shortlist presented in the survey questionnaire can still be included in the analysis. Since this question is a check-all-that-apply, I expect the answers of each respondent to range from zero to five factors. I only use a frequency to graph this, since I cannot express their answers in terms of cumulative percentage. Among the five choices (*tulong pinansyal/materyal, pagiging kilala, malinis na track record, mga sikat na proyekto, ibang dahilan*), it can be observed that financial assistance programs are checked the most by respondents. This was able to get 51 checks from respondents, which is 75% of the sample size. Only a few (10 respondents) checked the others category, and additional factors are usually religious identification or visible hard projects like gyms, bridges, roads, etc. For instance, one notable respondent only voted for the politician because it was mandated by his religious collective. The three remaining preset factors i.e. fame, projects and clean track record roughly got almost equal counts. Fame was checked by 35 respondents, clean track record was used as a factor by 34 respondents, and the visible project option got 37 checks. These three factors were used by about 50% to 54% of the respondents.
The survey also asked the respondents to rank the factors they checked during the previous question. This allows the researcher to get ordinal data among the factors checked by the respondents. If they checked all five factors, for example, they were to rank the choices from 1 to 5, with 1 being the first and most dominant factor, and 5 being the factor having the least light in their decision to vote. If they choose less than five choices, on the other hand, then they just have to rank the options they did choose, with 1 as still the highest and most dominant factor. The researcher then tabulated the frequency of 1s, 2s, 3s, 4s, and 5s, each factor was able to accumulate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Financial Assistance Programs</th>
<th>Fame</th>
<th>Clean Track Record</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Common Factors in Voting Ranked 1st to 5th

Observing the answers on row number 1, or how many times each factors got a score of 1 from the respondents, I can see that financial assistance programs lead the factors, with 33 respondents using it as the first and most important factor. It was followed by the
factor projects with 13, and closely by clean track record with 12. 9 respondents used fame as their most important factor in their decision to vote.

Looking at row number 2 of the table above, it can be seen that financial assistance programs is still leading, with 21 respondents ranking the aid they received as their second. Projects tied with fame in row number 2, with each getting 13 respondents. Again, the influence of financial assistance programs is observably huge since it’s chosen by many respondents as either their 1st or their 2nd most important factor when they decided to vote for the politician who aided them.

![Figure 10. Most dominant factor per individual (n=68)](image)

The last question in the survey was a direct categorical question for respondents. It was asked to see if they see that they feel indebted to the politicians. This also helps the researcher determine if *utang na loob* or debt of gratitude is present among the recipients of financial assistance programs. 84% of the respondents said they feel indebted to the politicians, and 16% said that they are not.

![Figure 11. Frequency of Recipient’s acknowledgement of *utang na loob* (n=68)](image)
**Expert Interviews**

In the course of conducting this research study, the researcher aimed to have an overview of the system of delivering discretionary soft projects to the poor, and I was lucky to hold an interview with former Kabataan Party-list representative Raymond “Mong” Palatino and an e-mailed interview response from the Social Watch Philippines, a non-governmental organization dedicated to the call to abolish all forms of discretionary funds in the country.

The line of questioning of the researcher in the interviews with the experts is focused on the Pork Barrel system, particularly because their expertise is related to soft projects released under the PDAF. Nonetheless, KBL and other financial assistance programs, as they are also discretionary soft projects, are closely related to the Pork Barrel, especially since they can produce the same clientelistic relationship between recipients and the politicians.

Table 8. Expert Data Presentation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Rep. Mong Palatino</th>
<th>Social Watch Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the forms of soft projects released by politicians? (specifically from PDAF)</td>
<td>Direct social services to citizens</td>
<td>So soft and hard, yung soft mga livelihood assistance, scholarship assistance, medical assistance, burial assistance, DSWD. Ah, Kung sa Department of Agriculture yan animal seedlings or animal dispersal, mga ganoon.</td>
<td>According to the DBM, “soft” projects, in general, pertain to the delivery of social services to citizens. These include scholarships, medical assistance, training, small infrastructure programs among others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paano ang proseso ng pag-aabot ng tulong ng mga Senador/Kongresista sa mga benepisaryo ng PDAF?</td>
<td>Tedious; vertically dyadic</td>
<td>Pupunta ka sa kanya. Sa ganoong klaseng set-up medyo disadvantaged na yung tao e. Or ito na nga yung nangyayari, you need connection. Kailangan mo ng koneksyon na malapit sa Senador o Congressman. So political patronage The NGOs and POs can also request legislators to fund certain projects through PDAF. The funds will be channeled to the appropriate agency or LGU to implement proposed projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ano ang karaniwang batayan ng isang politiko sa pagdedesisyon kung saang lugar niya ilalaan ang soft projects?</td>
<td>Election-motivated</td>
<td>Usually ang kanyang criteria for distribution, hindi doon sa who needs the money, parang ano yung may high impact? Ano yung may political impact? Or to be crude, or to be candid, sino yung makakapgbigay ng pinakaraming boto, o political support? Concentrated ang funds sa urban But irregularities emerge because of the level of discretion afforded to legislators in terms of project identification. The politicians’ bailiwicks, which are not necessarily the poorest towns, usually benefit from pork</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Translation</td>
<td>Answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa inyong pananaw, nakaapekto ba ang PDAF assistance sa voting behavior ng mga nakatatangap nito?</td>
<td>Utang na loob and image of progress</td>
<td>Financial assistance, when recipients are selected arbitrarily, strengthens the ties between the legislator and the beneficiary. As a result, this may elicit name-recall and desirability for the incumbent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the stance of recipients of soft projects towards the call to abolish discretionary funds like PDAF?</td>
<td>Fear of losing benefits</td>
<td>No answer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
nalunngkot ako kasi parang, nagkaroon tayo ng political consciousness na pag kailangan mo ng serbisyo dun ka sa pulitiko pupunta hindi roon sa hospital.

**In-depth Subject Interviews**

For the qualitative part of the research focusing on recipients of financial assistance programs, the researcher interviewed three recipients of medical assistance from different politicians. All of them are patients of the Philippine General Hospital. The ultimate goal of the qualitative interviews was to get insights from patients whose votes were affected by the assistance they received, and those who were not. This allows the researcher to see what could be the reasons why individuals vote for their politician-benefactors just because they received some form of financial assistance, or why some choose not to.

Table 9. Socio-demographic profiles of subject interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Reason for asking help from politician</th>
<th>Politician</th>
<th>Did You Vote for the Politician?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent 1</strong></td>
<td>No info</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Public school teacher</td>
<td>Chemotherapy</td>
<td>Congressman Recom Echiverri</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent 2</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Surveyor</td>
<td>Chemotherapy</td>
<td>Senator Gringo Honasan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent 3</strong></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Retired Tailor</td>
<td>Daughter’s cancer treatment</td>
<td>Mayor Vicente Amante</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questions are made to probe into the stories of the respondents, but only about the process of getting aid from politicians and other institutions. The researcher, as an ethical consideration, did not ask any question pertaining to the health conditions of the patient. I was able to interview two subjects who can be part of positive cases, and one subject from the negative case. All answers help the researcher further understand the behavior of individuals who receive financial assistance.

Table 10. Data Presentation of Subject Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Maaari mo bang ilarawan ang proseso ng pagkuha ng financial assistance? | Full of requirements          | • Dala –dala na lahat ng requirements, tinittingnan nila isa-isa. Kailangan mga original kasi kinukuha nila. Minsan iniinterview nila sa loob may mga nagaassist, parang mga tauhan niya.  
(Respondent 1)                                                             |                               |                                                                                                  |
|                                                                           |                               | • Hiningian kami ng certificate of indigent, barangay clearance, tsaka mga report galing sa ospital  
(Respondent 2)                                                            |                               |                                                                                                  |
|                                                                           |                               | • Lumapit po kami sa social service para mabigyan ng, ano nga, kung wala kaming dalang documents at tsaka yung mga, tawag dito, mga report, MRI, laboratory, tapos dapat naka-attached. Hiningian kami ng certificate of indigency sa barangay.  
(Respondent 3)                                                            |                               |                                                                                                  |
| Paano mo napagalamang posibleng humingi ng tulong mula sa pulitiko?       | Direct Connection to Politician | • Oo, dun sa kaibigan ko. Ah. Sinabi ko sa kanya. Pumunta ako sa agency, tapos sabi ko sa kanya ano ako, kumbaga resident ako ng Malabon. Tapos yung kay Honasan.  
(Respondent 2)                                                            |                               |                                                                                                  |
|                                                                           | Social Networks                | • Sabi ng mga officemate kong iba. May medical assistance daw ksi doon.  
(Respondent 1)                                                            |                               |                                                                                                  |
<p>|                                                                           |                               | • Yung mga kasama naming dito nagpapacheck-up, yung mga kasamahan naming sa San Pablo. Nagsabi sila na a may tulong diya apply tayo sa ganito. Kung saan |                               |                                                                                                  |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ano ang naramdaman mo nang makuha mo ang guarantee letter o ang tulong mula sa pulitiko?</th>
<th>Contentment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sa tingin niyo po ba ay dapat ipapatuloy, tanggali o may dapat ayusin sa programa?</td>
<td>Continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa kalakhan, gaano kaganda o kapangit ang pagtingin ninyo sa pamamalakad ng pulitiko?</td>
<td>Good Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                                                                        | Presence of electoral support by virtue of the financial assistance          | • Oo naman, kasi mabait talaga siya. Malaki talaga ang naging tulong niya sa pagpa-chemo ko. Malaki talaga siyang factor. Pero di lang naman yun yung dahilan. (Respondent 2)  
| Masasabi mo bang tumanaw ka ng utang na loob?                          | Vigilance over the responsibility of politicians                            | • Kasi lalo na ako titser titingnan ko kung sino ang magandang nagawa sa paligid sa pamayanan. Inoobserbahan din namin e. Kahit siguro di niya ako tinulungan, iboboto ko pa rin siya. Walang utang na loob, kasi hindi naman nila pera yun e. Iniiisip ko pera naman ng bayan yun e. |
|                                                                        | Direct feeling of gratitude                                                 | • Oo naman, kasi natulungan din ako. (Respondent 2)  
• Mayroon talaga. Kasi kahit papaano nadugtungan din yung pagpapagamot ng anak ko. Kung wala akong natanggap na tulong edo hindi dire-diretso ang pagpapagamot niya. Kaya mayroon. (Respondent 3) |
Data Analysis

In this part of the research study, I now analyze the data obtained from all the tools I used i.e. expert interviews, in-depth interviews, and survey questionnaires. I then relate these data as I analyze them with the specific objectives and the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of this research.

I start the analysis from the premise of this research, which is to say that politicians allocate social goods to specific parts of the population with or without intention to create a clientelistic relationship with the recipients on the ground. The theory of elite capture and clientelism by Barhdan & Mookherjee assumes that the elite has an interest in prolonging their stay in power, hence, the strategic allocation of government funds. The literature reviews also say that there is a motivation from political parties and/or politicians to allocate soft projects to individuals who will reciprocate that assistance through voting for them in the next election (Cayeros, 2007; Stokes, 2011; Kitschelt & Wilkinson. 2007; De La O, 2007, among others). Based from our expert interviews, it is also shown that politicians allocate soft projects to their bailiwicks and areas that will help them establish political patronage and consolidate votes. Nonetheless, the researcher thinks that it is beyond the scope of this research to argue that politicians have the deliberate intention to garner votes by way of financial assistance programs. What I want to look at and delve deeper into is the next part of the analysis, do these assistance programs create an implicit form of clientelism, regardless of whether the deliberate intention is present?

We can remember that the definition of clientelism is an exchange of goods offered by the politician in return for the vote of the recipients. In this research, I theorize that a new type of clientelism exists, where no explicit deals have been offered by the politician, yet recipients of the financial assistance programs reciprocate through the ballot because of utang na loob. To conclude if this kind of clientelism exists, I look at four main variables based on our objectives and the conceptual framework. Firstly, do recipients of the program have a good perception of the programs delivered by politicians, no matter how short term they are. Secondly, are politicians seen more positively by the recipients of financial assistance programs? Thirdly, are recipients more like to vote for their politician-benefactors, and do financial assistance programs play a large, if not overwhelming role,
in that decision to vote? Lastly, does the phenomenon of *utang na loob* exist among recipients of these financial assistance programs?

Prior to answering all of these questions based on the data I are able to gather during the implementation of the research protocol, I first characterize the process of being able to receive a financial assistance program from politicians. It differs from case to case, because some funds can only be accessed by individuals by going to the offices of government officials e.g. the Senate, House of Representatives, among others. This was the case of the subject interviewees. All of them received medical assistance from different politicians, (Congressman Recom Echiverri of Caloocan, Mayor Vicente Amante of Laguna, and Senator Gringo Honasan) but they had to go to different offices with a lot of requirements in order to get the financial assistance they need. The researcher is able to observe that in-cash assistance like medical and funeral assistance is usually sought for by an individual so that he/she can access the fund. However, the case is different with other types of assistance like the *Kasalang Bayan* (free wedding) and *Binyagang Bayan* (free baptismal), where local politicians periodically send members of their staff to the barangays in order to look for individuals who are willing to get married, or couples who want to have their child baptized. According to Sir Palatino, clientelism can start from the process of identifying or accepting would-be recipients of the short term social good. It can also be established that there is little to no interaction between the politician and the individual who will receive any form of financial assistance.

*Satisfaction from short term assistance*

This variable is the first indicator of clientelism. To clarify, for clientelism to be concluded to exist, the researcher should be able to get positive results from all indicators. For the first part, I look at how these financial assistance programs affect the satisfaction of recipients. Soft projects are short term social goods delivered by politicians and it usually engages recipients in one-time deals. Some recipients of medical assistance programs are able to receive cash grants or recommendatory letters more than once from the same politicians, but I know that these are more often than not short term assistance provided by politicians. According to De La O (2012), soft projects are like dole-outs, specifically referring to poverty reduction programs like the Conditional Cash Transfers. KBL and other financial assistance programs (medical assistance, scholarships and grocery packages
and cash grants) are also dole-outs provided by politicians. KBL and other financial assistance programs do not really put people out of poverty, since the forms of assistance are dole-out by nature. It’s not the same as free public education of stable jobs for the people, where they get services that are means to a better end. Free weddings, funeral assistance, occasional medical assistance, among others, are always temporary and band-aid. It will not make the person well-off, but will help them in their spending to some extent. Nonetheless, results show that recipients tend to feel that these programs have greatly helped them and their family, considering their socio-economic status. In the survey I conducted, 85% (58 out of 68) respondents said that the financial assistance program have either helped them a lot or have helped them very greatly (24 for napakalaking tulong, 34 for malaking tulong). This means that regardless if the financial assistance program given by the politician was in cash or in kind, the recipients still feel that they have been helped greatly. Analyzing these data, this satisfaction is probably because the assistance is very personal to the recipients. Respondent 3, a mother of a medical-assistance recipient, felt that any form of help from the local politicians have greatly helped their family with the hospital expenses. Although true, the assistance their family received did not even reach half of the expenses they incurred. Most of their payment to hospital expenses and other medical needs are from their own money.

In order to see if the satisfaction is affected by the amount of assistance received, the researcher is not able to use a linear regression model because not all types of financial assistance programs are quantifiable. Nonetheless, based on descriptive statistics, I can say that recipients see any kind of financial assistance as huge, even though it might be seen as small as a free wedding or a free baptismal for their children. Furthermore, based on our qualitative interviews, 2 of the 3 subjects said that the aid they received have greatly helped their family’s burden of spending for treatment costs. To quote respondent 2: “Kasi P5,000 lang ang hiningi ko, pero yung binigay P16,000.” No cash amount was directly given to respondent 2, but only a recommendation letter from the office of Senator Gringo Honasan, yet she felt very thankful for the amount of help she received. This corroborates the findings of Berkeley et al. (2011) and Green & Lawson (2012), where they said the politicians are more likely to create clientelistic relationships with the poor, and not the more educated, more informed middle-class. This is probably because the poor see these
kinds of aid as huge, even though not much has been spent for their long term welfare at the end of the day. The fact that no respondent said that the aid they received was too little, or did not help at all means that to some extent, they value the help they received greatly.

In fact, when I further asked about whether these kinds of short term programs should continue, I get overwhelmingly positive results. 99% of the 68 respondents said that they are willing to allow these kinds of programs to continue. This is because respondents see these kinds of help as positive. In our qualitative interviews with Pork Barrel recipients, I can even make a stronger case. Out of the three interviewees, only two out of three voted for their politician-benefactors because of the financial assistance they were able to receive, but all of them wanted the Priority Development Assistance Fund to continue. We all know that the campaign against the Pork Barrel system has been very strong the past few years, and it lead to the Supreme Court resolution declaring the Pork Barrel unconstitutional in November 2013. This should make us expect that citizens would want to have the Pork Barrel scrapped, considering the corruption that has occurred inside the government. And yet, all three subjects explained that they cannot allow the PDAF, or any kind of soft project, to be abolished because of the help it is able to give the poor. Respondent 1, who was keen not to vote for her politician-benefactor just because of the assistance she received, still had a bias towards the PDAF: “Ayusin lang. Kasi mahirap din kung tatangga lin wala na silang maitutulong.” Disappointed about the abolition of the PDAF, Respondent 3 puts: “Ito nga di na siya nakapagpachemo kasi sabi nila nawala. Importante rin ituloy. Kaya nga nitong bago lang hindi na kami nakahingi kasi wala na raw.” Prior to asking them about their stance towards the program, all of the subject interviewees were asked if they were aware of the Pork Barrel scam and the billions of pesos allegedly pocketed by politicians. However, all of the subject interviewees form part of the population who want the PDAF not be abolished, primarily because of how it can help the poor with dole-outs like medical assistance programs. This shows that the effect of soft projects to the mindset of the people, and since the help they received is very close to their hearts, people are more likely to ignore even scandalous actions of politicians like corruption. This is because the gut economy is very strong. This supports the work of a lot of authors (Wantchekon, 2003; Desposato, 2007; Kitschelt, 2000; Scott, 1976 as cited by Stokes, 2011), because this proves that people are risk-averse, giving more importance to the benefits they receive
today from soft projects than the long-term benefits of abolishing funds that are prone to corruption like PDAF. Observably, there is a positive attachment between recipients and financial assistance programs no matter how short term they are. Former Kabataan Rep. Palatino explained that the main reason why recipients are very positive towards the financial assistance programs, even the scandal-marred Pork Barrel system, is because they fear that the benefits that they’ve been receiving from the politicians can be removed in future.

This importance and satisfaction that recipients feel are the first step to showing the existence of an implicit form of patron-client relationship. If I refer back to how Hollnsteiner (1961) described patron-client relationship, it is a “dyadic, mutually-beneficial relationship.” This positive perception towards the program, and the deliberate willingness to continue these programs because of how they benefit the poor, shows that from the perspective or the respondents, a mutually-beneficial relationship exists.

**Positive Perception of Politician**

Given that these kinds of financial assistance programs are directly delivered by the politician, the researcher decided to see how the recipients perceive their benefactors. Definitely, these programs are very different from those delivered by formal agencies of government designed for a specific purpose e.g. DSWD, DepEd, DOH, etc. These types of agencies deliver assistance to the people like educational scholarships, medical discounts, indigent support, among others, but no direct attribution is made by people on the ground to any specific person. This is not the case with KBL and other financial assistance programs of politicians, because as Rep. Palatino described the transactions, they are very “personalistic”. Since the distribution is carried out by members of the staff, as confirmed by the respondents in Barangay Sun Valley, people attribute the program as one initiated and facilitated by the politician, regardless if he/she is a member of the legislative or the executive. Furthermore, for some to get some form of assistance from a government official, they have to go directly to the offices of these politicians. This then allows politician to attribute all projects released under their offices to themselves. In fact, all of the 68 respondents of the survey I administered named a politician, and not any government agency. This shows that attribution is present at start. In fact, the respondents from Barangay Sun Valley said that the politician who provides free weddings regularly is
actually the godfather of the couples themselves. Now, how does this attribution affect their positive/negative perception towards these government officials?

The first question I used to indicate positive perception is to ask respondents to answer a Likert Scale, where they score the politician’s ability to do his/her responsibility overall, with 5 as the highest and 1 as the lowest score.

Looking at the results of the survey, almost half (46%) of the recipients gave their respective politician-benefactors a score of 5, and this is followed by 14 (21%) respondents who gave their benefactors a score of 4. Based from descriptive statistics, this means that more often than not, recipients of financial assistance programs will develop a positive perception towards their politician. A total of 45 respondents scored either a 5 or a 4, and only 9 respondents gave a score of 2 or 1. Using proportion, for every 1 recipient who sees the politician negatively, you can get 5 who sees you positively.

When asked whether they see their politician-benefactor more positively or more negatively, I observed that 88% said that they have a positive perception of their respective politician-benefactor. According to Social Watch Philippines, arbitrary selection of recipients strengthens the ties between politicians and the poor and as a consequence “elicit name-recall and desirability for the incumbent.” One of the interview subjects nicely explained why she developed a positive perception towards the politician: “Maganda [ang pananaw ko sa kanya]. Maaasikaso ka talaga sa munisipyo. Once lumapit ka, automatic na ‘yan. Tutulungan ka.” This shows that the persistence of politicians to send their staff to communities, or to show a hospitable impression when accepting applicants of financial assistance programs, contribute to the positive perception of people towards them. What’s interesting to note is that the staff are the ones who process the requirements of the recipients. They’re also the ones who meet the individuals, not the politicians. Nonetheless, the attribution is still directly connected to the politician. This creates a relationship based on government funds. It is highly probable that many individuals will never meet their politician-benefactors for the rest of their lives. Yet, because of attributable assistance programs that are close to the heart of the people, it seems as if individuals feel the touch of the politicians from afar. This attachment contributes highly to the possibility of clientelism, because the patron-client system becomes more apparent.
However, to be sure that the positive perception is highly associated with the financial assistance programs people receive, the researcher asked a follow-up: “Did the help you received affect your positive perception towards the politician?”

| Oo nakaapekto ang natanggap ko | 61 |
| Hindi nakaapekto ang natanggap ko | 7 |

Table 11. The effect of assistance programs to the positive image of politicians (n=68)

This table descriptively shows that respondents who had a positive perception towards the politician (88% of 68) admitted that the financial assistance they received affected that perception. Only 7 respondents said that it didn’t affect their positive perception, either because their positive perception was caused by other factors, or they never had a positive perception of the politician to begin with. I used a Chi-square Test of Independence to further confirm the association between the positive perception and the influence of the financial assistance program to that positive perception. Moreover, I also use Pearson’s Phi and Cramer’s V, measures of the weight of association assuming association does exist, to see how strong the difference is between the two variables. I use the 90% significance level, with a 0.10 error of margin. In order to say that there is an association between the two variable, a chi-square value greater than 2.706, the significant threshold for chi-square at 90% confidence level with degree of freedom value 1, must be obtained. Below is the chi-square table:

Null hypothesis: There is no association between the positive perception of recipients towards the politicians and the financial assistance program recipients received.

Alternate hypothesis: There is an association between the positive perception of recipients towards the politicians and the financial assistance program they received.
The assistance influenced my positive perception. The assistance did not influence my positive perception.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The assistance influenced</th>
<th>The assistance did not influence</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have a positive perception towards the politician</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a negative perception towards the politician</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Chi-square between positive perception and financial assistance programs

The chi-square value attained is 7.267, which suggests that there is a difference or an association between the variables “Do you see the politician more positively” and “Did the financial assistance program you received influenced your positive perception.” Because the data violated a necessary assumption of the chi-square, which states that all cells have to have at least 5 frequencies, I look for a more reliable tool to determine association- the Fisher’s Exact Test (FET). To know if there is a significance and consequently an association, the value of the test must be less than 0.1, which is the maximum allotted margin of error for this chi-square table set at 90% reliability. The value of the FET is .024, which is less than 0.1. Hence, I conclude from this chi-square test that at both 90% and even 95% levels of confidence, an association between the financial assistance program and the positive perception of recipients exist. I reject the null hypothesis and do not reject the alternate hypothesis.

To see the weight of the association, the researcher refers to the value of the Pearson’s Phi and the Cramer’s V. Both show a value of .327. In the table for the light of association used by the researcher, which is based from the standard table for both Pearson’s Phi and Cramer’s V, I derive that .327 shows moderate association between the two variables.
Reciprocation by way of the Vote

This indicator is the most important benchmark of whether or not an implicit form of clientelism exists between politicians and their recipients. This is because the original objective of this study was to see if financial assistance programs can be used as vote-buying mechanisms of incumbent politicians. To prove that financial assistance programs have a huge influence over the votes of the recipients, survey respondents were asked if the financial assistance programs they received played a role in their vote.

I start off our analysis of the actual vote by looking at the answers presented by our expert respondents. Rep. Palatino said that in the process of delivering financial assistance programs to the poor, there seems to be an unwritten, implicit agreement between politicians and their beneficiaries. They give them something, and they expect something in return. This is why increased voter support has been proven to exist not only in financial assistance programs, but also in Conditional Cash Transfers (Torres, 2010). There has been an observed increase in incumbent support from recipients of different poverty reduction programs in the Latin Americas, and I tried to verify whether this exists in our research site as well. Out of the 68 respondents I surveyed, 96% of them either voted for their politician-benefactor in an election immediately succeeding their receipt of the financial assistance program, or are willing to vote for their politician-benefactor assuming the election was conducted the same day the survey was administered. This shows at face value that there is incumbent support after the provision of social goods and programs to the poor. However, to fully understand whether or not the vote was strongly influenced by the financial assistance programs recipients received, I ask several questions to buttress this indicator.

When I asked the respondents to answer a Likert Scale to determine the extent of the influence of the assistance they received to their actual vote, 72% said that their receipt of the financial assistance played either a large role, or was the only factor they used in deciding to vote for their politician-benefactor. 30 respondents said that it played a big role, while 19 admitted that the assistance they received was the only factor they used in deciding to vote for the politician. One-fifth of the respondents said that the financial assistance program did not affect their decision to vote for the politician, while in aggregate, the other 80% admit that the financial assistance they received have affected their votes in different extents. I try to relate one of the subjects I had in the in-depth interview to decipher
why some individuals do not use the assistance they receive as a factor in their vote. Respondent 1 said that regardless of who is the incumbent government official, she can be able to ask for financial assistance anyway. This shows that Respondent 1 was able to see herself in a position of power, where she realized that her vote should not necessarily be given to the politician who helped her in order to receive the financial benefits. The 20% who answered that financial assistance programs did not play in their vote can perhaps be explained by the stipulations of Respondent 1. Respondent 1, who is a public school teacher, showed vigilance towards these schemes of politicians. The fact that her education allowed her an understanding of her rights as a citizen made her base her vote on the actual performance of her politician-benefactor, not the assistance she received. The two other subjects I interviewed, on the other hand, recognized that their vote was heavily influenced of the help they received from the politician. To quote Respondent 3: “Malaki yan [‘yung papel ng natanggal na tulong sa naging boto]. Malaki talaga yan. Kaya nga matagal na siyang mayor, kasi maganda talga pamamalakad niya. Tulad nitong ambulansya, libre.”

Based on observation, I am confident that financial assistance programs have a huge influence to the vote of recipients and more often than not, they will vote for the politician who delivered the assistance. This can be tied to the theoretical framework, where financial assistance programs dominate the decision-making processes of individuals when voting.

I use a Chi-square Test of Independence to see if there is indeed an association between the variables “Did you vote for the politician” and “Did the financial assistance you received affect your decision to vote for the politician?” I uniformly use the same significance level (90%), and therefore, has to surpass the chi-square threshold of 2.706 with degree of freedom 1 to conclude that there is an association. Below is the chi-square table:

Null hypothesis: There is no association between the votes of the recipients to whether or not the assistance they received affected their vote

Alternate hypothesis: There is an association between the votes of the recipients to whether or not the assistance they received affected their vote
Table 13. Chi-square between vote of individuals and financial assistance programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The assistance I received</th>
<th>The assistance I received did not affect my vote</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I voted for the politician</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I did not vote for the politician</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since more than one cells have a frequency less than 5, I use the FET value to determine if there is an association. The FET yielded a value of 0.011, which is less than the 0.1 allotted margin of error. This means that I can conclude that there is an association between the vote of a recipient and the influence of the financial assistance they received to that vote. Of course, chi-square is a symmetric statistical tool, which means that I cannot really determine the independent variable amongst the variables, but at least the researcher is confident to say that there is an association among the two. Furthermore, by using the Pearson’s Phi and the Cramer’s V table, I see that values are the same at .387. There is a moderate association between the two variables.

In order to solidify the researcher’s claim that financial assistance programs are used as the most dominant, if not the only, factor when recipients vote for their politician-benefactors, I also tried to look at other possible factors that may affect the decision-making processes of individuals. This is why I asked the respondents a check-all-that-apply question, “What are the factors you used when you decided to vote for the politician?” I initially use a frequency analysis to see which factor is most dominant among all factors, and I’ll also use another statistical tool, the Chi-square Test of Goodness of Fit for single variables, to see if financial assistance programs dominate the other factors.

Among all of the factors (financial assistance, fame, clean track records, visible projects, others), financial assistance programs emerged as the most frequently-checked option by the respondents. 51 respondents (75%) had financial assistance programs as one of their factors in deciding to vote for their politician-benefactors. 50% valued a clean track record, 54% identified visible projects as important, and 51% used the fame of the
politician as a factor in their vote. From this observation, I see that this question is consistent with the results I saw earlier, where at least 20% of the sample size did not use the assistance they received as a factor in voting. Visible projects came in second as the most frequently-checked option, while the “others” option was selected only by 10% of the sample size. I analyze this table by saying that the substantial difference between the number of checks for financial assistance programs and all the other options is because of the fact that some respondents only used the assistance they received as the sole factor in deciding to vote for their politician-benefactor. This data indicate that there will be individuals who will be motivated to vote for a politician solely on the basis of financial assistance. However, the substantial number of respondents who said that financial assistance programs played a large role in their votes, still considered some factors e.g. fame, projects, and clean track record. To further analyze the difference in the extents of these factors, I tried to elicit an ordinal response from the respondents. They were only to rank the factors that they checked (1 being the most dominant). Financial assistance programs still emerged the leading factor in the vote of the respondents, having been ranked number 1 by most respondents. Almost half (49%) of the respondents scored the financial assistance as their most dominant factor. The rest is quite evenly distributed among fame (13%), clean track records (18%), and projects (19%). I then use the chi-square goodness of fit test for one variable to see there is a statistical different among the factors. I first use the number of times each factor was able to get a rank of 1st as the variable for the chi-square goodness of fit test. The degree of freedom is 4, since there are 5 options in the variable. Hence, with a 90% confidence level, the chi-square value should surpass 7.779 to say that the factor with the highest quantity has a statistical difference compared to the rest. In a Chi-square goodness of fit test, I expect all factors to be ranked 1st evenly among the respondents, if I go beyond the chi-square value, then a statistical difference is present. Below is the table:

Null hypothesis: There is no statistical difference between all of the factors.
Alternate hypothesis: There is a statistical difference between all of the factors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of a score of 1st per factor</th>
<th>Observed N</th>
<th>Expected N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fame</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Track Record</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14. Chi-square goodness of fit between factors of voting ranked as 1 (n=68)

I yield a chi-square value of 41.118, which is higher than the 7.779 benchmark. Hence, I conclude based from this test of goodness of fit that financial assistance differs statistically from the other factors. I reject the null hypothesis and do not reject the alternate hypothesis.

Not only was the financial assistance factor the most dominant descriptively and statistically from the factors in terms of being ranked 1st, it is also observed by the researcher that among the factors ranked 2nd by the respondents, assistance programs still lead with 21. I are, therefore, confident in saying that assistance programs indeed dominate the other factors that are present. Based from the subject interviews, Respondent 2 and 3, who admitted that they voted for their politician-benefactor largely based on the assistance they received, yet they still considered several factors. Nonetheless, after analyzing the variables, the researcher can say that financial assistance programs dominate the decision-making processes of voters during elections. Social Watch Philippines also stipulated that other factors in voting such as fame can even be caused by financial assistance programs. This means that it may even be possible that other factors used in voting are still influenced by the assistance people receive.

*The Phenomenon of Utang na loob*

The last indicator we look at is the existence of the phenomenon of *utang na loob*. From our expectation, this variable is the main reason why individuals self-enforce their clientelism, even without the existence of an explicit deal of exchange between politicians and recipients. Both Rep. Palatino and Social Watch Philippines agree that *utang na loob* will more likely exist to recipients of the KBL and other financial assistance programs.
Based on our interview with our subjects, they manifested the existence of a feeling of indebtedness to the politicians themselves, because the politicians aided their family members or themselves in one way or another. Respondent 3 emotionally said: “Minsan mas mabuti pa nga humingi ng tulong sa pulitiko kaysa sa sarili mong kamag-anak.” The fact that politicians were there when Respondent 3’s family was at the time of need created a huge feeling of indebtedness on the part of Respondent 3. Since other relatives were not present to give financial support, the gratitude towards the politician-benefactor became greater.In the course of surveying one of the respondents in Barangay Sun Valley, she also expressed that the cakes and the gifts (free perfumes, groceries, movie tickets) they get during her birthday courtesy of the office of the politician makes her feel indebted, because no one does those kinds of help to her. These answers are manifestations that utang na loob remains strong amongst our respondents. In fact, 84% said that they feel indebted towards politicians. Only 11 respondents said that they don’t feel indebted at all. Respondent 1 from the in-depth interview provides an interesting insight why people don’t develop a feeling of indebtedness: “Walang utang na loob, kasi hindi naman nila pera yun e. Iniisip ko pera naman ng bayan yun e.” Some people may recognize that it is their own money anyway, and it can dissuade them from voting politicians just because of utang na loob. This is notable because when people are informed, as argued by Berkeley et al. (2011), the chances of politician being able to push through with the clientelistic relationship becomes slimmer. Moreover, According to Sobel (2005) and Cox et al. (2007) as cited by Berkeley et al. (2011), this is what they call intrinsic reciprocity, the urge to repay an individual who has helped one in the past. This is different to materialistic reciprocity, where individuals repay their debtors only for the sake of being able to get more material benefits in the future. This past-looking utang na loob phenomenon is what I see from the respondents.

In order to relate utang na loob with the actual vote of the recipients, I then conduct another Chi-square Test of Independence between two variables, “did you vote for the politician” and “do you feel indebted to the politician?” This will help allow the researcher to make the final jump into the conclusion. Does the phenomenon of utang na loob, as a result of the financial assistance programs, affect the tendency of people to vote for their politician-benefactors? Below is the table:
Null hypothesis: There is no association between the phenomenon of utang na loob and the actual vote of recipients

Alternate hypothesis: There is an association between the phenomenon of utang na loob and the actual vote of recipients.

Table 15. Chi-square between vote of individuals and utang na loob

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I voted for the politician</th>
<th>I did not vote for the politician</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tumanaw ako ng utang na loob</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi ako tumanaw ng utang na loob</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since more than one cell has a frequency less than 5, I then shy away from the chi-square value as the test of significance, and look at the Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) to see if there is an association. With 90% significance level, and 0.10 margin of error, I got a FET score of 0.066, which is less than the threshold. Hence, I are then to reject the null hypothesis, and to not reject the alternate hypothesis. There is an association between utang na loob and the tendency of recipients to vote for their politician-benefactors. To see the light of association, I then used the Pearson’s Phi and the Cramer’s V. I see that there is a value of .295 for both, leading us to the conclusion that there is a moderate association between the two variables.

Since chi-square test of independence is good in determining the presence of an association between two variables, but it is a symmetric test of association. To further strengthen our conclusion about how utang na loob affects the vote of recipients, I use the statistical tool binary logistic regression. This allows us to use utang na loob as an independent categorical variable, and see how it affects the tendency of people to vote for politician-benefactors. With 90% confidence level, I get a 0.043 significance value, which means that the null hypothesis has to be rejected. This proposes that there is an association between utang na loob and the tendency of people to vote for their politician-benefactors.
### Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step</strong></td>
<td>4.092</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Block</strong></td>
<td>4.092</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model</strong></td>
<td>4.092</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16. Logistic Regression between *utang na loob* and the actual vote of recipients

Using the logistic regression model, I say *utang na loob* has a predictive capacity to the tendency of recipients to vote for politicians who delivered assistance to them. This time, *utang na loob* can be confirmed as the independent variable, and the vote is a dependent variable. I also use the Nagelkerke R to determine on a scale from 0 to 1, what is the propensity of the independent variable to affect the dependent variable. I get a value .192, which means that the tendency of recipients to vote for their politician-benefactors is affected 19.2% of the time. The researcher is confident to say that the feeling of indebtedness has a predictive capacity towards the tendency of recipients to vote for their politician-benefactors.

Given the positive results from the four variables indicative of *utang na loob* clientelism, it can be seen that individuals who receive aid that is directly attributable to individual politicians are less likely to be able to vote freely. This is because their ability to use other factors such as ideology or forward-looking plans for the country can be overpowered by the fact that the benefits they received heavily influenced their decision to vote for a particular politician. In theory, elite politics can further be entrenched as a result of these kinds of short-term social goods.
To summarize all of the chi-square tests of independence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable 1</th>
<th>Variable 2</th>
<th>Fisher’s Exact Test</th>
<th>Pearson’s Phi and Cramer’s V</th>
<th>Light of association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you see the politician more positively?</td>
<td>Did the assistance you received influence your positive perception?</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>.327</td>
<td>Moderate association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you vote for the politician</td>
<td>Did the assistance you received played a role in your vote</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>.387</td>
<td>Moderate association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you vote for the politician?</td>
<td>Do you feel indebted towards the politician?</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>Moderate association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17. Summary of chi-square tests of independence

Conclusion

Based on the analysis and the triangulation of available data, the researcher is confident that all dependent variables are present as a result of KBL and other financial assistance programs. First, recipients show great value to the assistance they receive from the politicians regardless if the assistance is in cash or in kind. The financial assistance programs also contribute to the positive image of politicians, and this allows them to establish such great social capital among the people on the ground. I’ve also proven that high levels of electoral support are present, given that there is a high propensity for recipients to vote for their politician-benefactors. Extending that analysis, I saw that financial assistance programs become the major factor in determining the vote of recipients,
thereby dominating the decision-making processes of individuals during elections. I’ve also been able to nuance the analysis to utang na loob, and I’ve seen that individuals more often than not feel indebted towards their benefactors. Utang na loob as a result of the assistance recipients receive can also affect their decision to reelect the incumbent. Thus, I conclude that the chances of getting the support of the recipients for reelection is higher when politicians deliver assistance programs that are directly attributed to their office or their person. Lastly, the researcher is able to conclude that an implicit form of clientelism exists, because even though politicians never initiated a clientelistic transaction to voters, there is a normal tendency for recipients to reelect incumbents largely based on these forms of assistance and utang na loob.

Conclusively, KBL and other financial assistance programs are a government-sponsored, legal, implicit and institutionalized form of vote-buying, benefiting the elite further by getting increased incumbent support from the poor. This creates a lot of repercussions in a democracy, since the poor’s vote is more or less already controlled by incumbent politicians who can successfully deliver KBL and other types of financial assistance programs. Further, the fairness of the political landscape can be skewed towards the elite, since Philippine local politics is heavily dominated by them.

Recommendation

The researcher implores the political will of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and people’s organizations (POs) to adopt the conclusions of this research as a case against discretionary funds in general. The expectation is that officials inside the government would argue that there’s nothing wrong with getting increased electoral support as a result of their delivery of services. However, the fact that politicians can benefit from the taxpayers’ money by using it to their own political advantage, whether intentional or unintentional, calls for a question of the fairness in the electoral arena. The researcher recommends that all forms of social services be tasked to the different agencies (DOH, DepEd, and DSWD, among others) of government, where no direct attribution to a particular person can be made by recipients. Since the Local Government Code of 1992 has already been enacted, the proper implementation of it, the creation of stable chapters
of agencies in different areas in the Philippines, will nullify the usual argument of politicians that their role in the delivery of services is important because they know what their constituents need. I recognize the need for the delivery of basic social services, but it should not come at the cost of the elite benefitting too much from discretionary funds.

Furthermore, education on the ground is very important to ensure that the poor become more mature in voting. NGOs, POs and concerned formations who want to promote free and fair elections can partake in the education campaign. The education campaign does not have to be direct in telling people not to vote based on *utang na loob*, since the poor might see this as a normal and legitimate way to vote for politicians. This is why the grassroots solution is two-fold: 1) Voters can be explicitly told not to feel indebted because after all, the assistance they receive from the offices of individuals are from the coffers of the people anyway, or 2) indirectly make people more mature in voting by letting them know their rights as citizens. This way, we can imbue a sense of entitlement for the poor, where instead of seeing assistance as a privilege, they’re going to see it as a right that they can demand and claim. This involves a more holistic approach towards the education of the grassroots. This paper hopes to empower the poor by making them understand their demandable rights.
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APPENDICES
Annex A (Expert Interview Guide)

Expert Interview Guide

1) Anu-ano ang mga iba’t-ibang porma ng paggamit ng mga Senador/Kongresista sa kani-kaniyang PDAF?
2) Maaari ka bang magbigay ng mga halimbawa ng soft projects ng mga Senador/Kongresista gamit ang pork barrel?
3) Paano ang proseso ng pag-aabot ng tulong ng mga Senador/Kongresista sa mga benepisaryo ng PDAF?
4) Noong hindi pa idineklara ang Pork Barrel bilang labag sa konstitusyon, totoo bang maaaring maglaan ng PDAF ang isang kongresista sa isang distritong hindi niya sakop?
5) Ano ang karaniwang batayan ng isang pulitiko sa pagdedesisyon kung saan programa at anong lugar niya ilalaan ang kanyang PDAF?
6) Sa inyong pananaw, nakaaapekto ba ang PDAF assistance sa voting behavior ng mga nakatatanggap nito?
7) Anu-ano kaya ang dahilan kung bakit nagbabalik-loob ang mga mamamayang nakatanggap ng PDAF?
8) Mayroon ka bang impormasyon ukol sa saloobin ng mga nakatanggap ng PDAF ukol sa ikinakasang batas upang isabasura ang Pork Barrel?
9) Sa pagkawala ng PDAF, mawawala na rin kaya ang suporta ng mga benepisaryo ng PDAF sa mga kongresista/senador na tumulong sa kanila?
10) Sapat na ba ang Supreme Court decision upang tanggalin ang lahat ng porma ng PDAF? May iba pa bang mga porma ng discretionary funds sa alinmang ahensiya ng gobyerno na maaaring magdulot ng parehong epekto gaya ng sa PDAF?
Annex B (Informed Consent Form)

Unibersidad ng Pilipinas Maynila

Ang Informed Consent Form na ito ay para sa mga botanteng nakatanggap na ng anumang pinansyal o materyal na tulong mula sa opisina ng isang pulitiko at lumahok sa isang pananaliksik na pinamagatang “Strings Attached: the Clientelistic Effect of Medical and KBL (Kasal, Binyag, Libing) Assistance Programs of Politicians to the Voting Behavior of the Poor in a selected Barangay in Metro Manila.”

Pangalan ng mananaliksik: John Psalmuel V. Chan
Institusyong kinabibilangan: Unibersidad ng Pilipinas Maynila


Maaari po kayong humindi sa buong interbyu/sarbey o sa mga piling katanungan kung hindi kayo kumportable. Mahalaga po ang inyong pag-iilim ng mananaliksik upang wala nang pahintulot mula sa inyo. Ang lahat ng magiging resulta ng nasabing pananaliksik ay magiging bukas sa inyo bilang pasasalamat.

Kung sakaling may mga salitang hindi ninyo maintindihan, maaaring tanungin ang mananaliksik upang mas malaman pa ang mga tanong. Kung kayo po ay may karagdagang katibayan o nais kinaruhan, maaari nyo pong i-text ang mananaliksik sa numerong 09066889875, o padalhan ng e-mail sa psalmuelchan@gmail.com.

Katibayan ng Consent

Aking nabasa ang mga impormasyon patungkol sa magiging interbyu/sarbey, o di naman kaya’y binasa sa akin ang mga ito. Nabiyan ako ng pagkakataong magtanong o kinaruhan ang mga lalamanin ng magiging interbyu/sarbey, at ako’y sumasang-ayon na lumahok sa nasabing pananaliksik at sagutin ang mga katanungan sa interbyu/sarbey sa abot ng aking kaalaman.

Pangalan ng Respondent _____________________
Lagda ng Respondent ___________________
Petsa ________________

Binasa at Pinaliwanag sa respondent ang impormasyon at magiging takbo ng interbyu sa kabuuan. Ito ay ang katibayan na nagbigay ng consent ang respondent sa interbyu/sarbey na gaganapin.

Pangalan ng Mananaliksik _____________________
Lagda ng Mananaliksik ___________________
Petsa ________________
### Annex C (Survey Questionnaire)

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</table>

|----------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|

<table>
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<th>Para saan ang tulong na nakuha mula sa pulitiko:</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Saan-saang ahensiya ng gobyerno ka nakahingi ng tulong?
   - Opisina ng Senador
   - Opisina ng Kongresista o Kinatawan
   - Opisina ng Mayor o Gobernador
   - Opisina ng Kapitan ng Barangay

2) Isulat kung sinu-sino ang mga pulitiko na nahingian na ng tulong, ilang beses nang nakabalik sa kani-knilang opisina, ano ang tulong na ibinigay, magkano ang naibigay na tulong ng bawat isa, at kailan ang huling paghingi ng tulong:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pangalan ng Pulitiko</th>
<th>Ano ang porma ng tulong na naibigay</th>
<th>Anong taon huling nakahingi ng tulong</th>
<th>Magkano ang pangkalahatang naibigay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) Paano nakatulong ang naibigay na pinansyal/materyal na tulong ng pulitiko?
   - Napakalaking tulong
   - Malaking tulong
   - Maliit na tulong
   - Napakaliit na tulong
   - Walang itinulong

4) Sa tingin mo ba ay dapat ipagpatuloy ang naturang programa/proyekto?
   - Oo
   - Hindi

5) Sa iyong pananaw, timbangin kung gaano ka-husay ginagampanan ng pulitiko ang kanyang responsibilidad. (5 bilang pinaka-positibo at 1 bilang pinaka-negatibo)
   - 1
   - 2
   - 3
   - 4
   - 5

6) Masasabi mo bang mas positibo o mas negatibo ang pagtingin mo sa naturang pulitiko
   - Mas positibo
   - Mas negatibo
6.1) Sa iyong pananaw, nakaapekto ba ng pagtulong niya sa iyo o sa iyong pamilya sa iyong naging positibong pagtingin sa kanyang pamamahala?
   o Oo
   o Hindi

7) Nakaboto ka ba noong huling eleksyon na tumakbo ang naturang pulitiko?
   o Oo (sagutin lamang ang tanong 7.1)
   o Hindi (sagutin lamang ang tanong 7.2)

7.1) Kung nakaboto ka, binoto mo ba pulitiko noong huling beses siyang tumakbong muli sa kaniyang pusisyon o sa mas mataas na pusisyon?
   o Oo
   o Hindi

7.2) Kung hindi ka nakaboto, halimbawa ngayon ang eleksyon at tumakbo siya muli sa kaniyang pusisyon o sa mas mataas na pusisyon, iboboto mo ba ang naturang pulitiko?
   o Oo
   o Hindi

8) Anu-ano ang mga dahilan kung bakit mo iboboto ang naturang kongresista? (Itiman ang bilog nang lahat ng naaangkop)
   o Pagbibigay niya ng tulong pinansyal o materyal
   o Malinis na track record
   o Kilala siya sa aming lugar
   o Magagandang mga proyekto
   o Iba (isulat): ____________________________________________

8.1) Pagsunud-sunurin ang mga dahilan ayon sa bigat (1-pinakamabigat, 5-pinakamagaan)
   _____ Tulong pinansyal/materyal
   _____ Pagiging kilala
   _____ Malinis na track record
   _____ Mga Proyekto
   _____ Ibang rason (kung mayroon, isulat): ______________________________

8.2) Gaano kalaki ang naging papel ng pagtanggap mo ng tulong pinansyal o tulong materyal ng pulitiko sa iyong naging pagboto sa kanya?
   o Ito ang naging tanging basihan
   o Malaki ang naging papel nito
   o Katamtaman lang ang naging papel nito
   o Maliit na maliit ang naging papel nito
   o Hindi ko ito ginamit bilang basihan sa aking naging boto

9) Masasabi mo bang tumanaw ka ng utang na loob?
   o Oo
   o Hindi
Annex D (Interview Guide for PDAF recipients)

Interview Guide for PDAF Medical Assistance Recipients

Pangalan (optional):
Edad:
Kasarian:
Trabaho:
Bilang ng anak:
Kinikita ng pamilya buwan-buwan:
Taon huling nakahingi ng tulong-medikal sa Kongresista/Senador:
Taon huling bumoto:

1) Bakit mo kinailangang humingi ng tulong mula sa mga kongresista/senador? Para kanino ang hiningi mong tulong mula sa kongresista/senador?
2) Maaari mo bang ilarawan ang proseso ng pagkuha ng tulong mula sa PDAF ng mga pulitiko?
3) Kani-kaninong opisina ka nakakuha ng suportang pampinansyal?
4) Paano mo napag-alamang posible ang paghingi ng tulong mula sa naturang opisina?
5) Paano mo napiling humingi sa naturang pulitikong iyon? Saan ka unang humingi ng tulong?
6) Ano ang naramdaman mo nang makuha mo ang guarantee letter mula sa opisina ng pulitiko?
7) Sa iyong panining, gaano kalaki ang naging tulong ng PDAF sa inyong pinaggastusan?
8) Kung wala ang PDAF mula sa naturang kongresista/senador, saan po kayo sumubok humingi pa ng tulong?
9) May iba pa bang institusyon/personalidad kayong sinubukang hingian ng tulong? Saan pinakamabalis ang naging serbisyo?
10) Nabalitaan mo na ba o narinig ang tungkol sa P10 bilyong ninakaw na yaman mula sa mga pork barrel ng mga iilang mga kongresista/senador?
11) Ano ang iyong pananaw sa PDAF o pork barrel matapos ang naging kontrobersya ukol sa paggamit nito?
12) Noong hindi pa lumabas ang kontrobersya ng PDAF, ano ang naging pagtingin ninyo sa sumuportang kongresista/senador?
13) Matapos ang pagkalat ng kontrobersya ukol sa PDAF scam, paano nag-iba ang iyong pananaw sa naturang kongresista/senador?
14) Ano ang dahilan kung bakit naging positibo/negatibo ang iyong pananaw ukol sa naturang kongresista? (maaarang sumagot nang higit sa isa)
15) Binoto mo ba ang kongresistang tumulong sa iyong pamilya?
16) Bakit mo napagdesisyunang iboto ang naturang senadoor/kongresista?
17) May papel ba ang pagtanggap mo ng PDAF sa iyong naging desisyong iboto siya?
18) Anu-ano ang iba pang mga naging salik sa iyong pagdesisyyon na iboto siya?
19) Gaano kalaki ang papel ng pagtanggap mo ng PDAF sa naging desisyon mo na iboto siya?
20) Masasabi mo bang tumanaw ka ng *utang na loob* sa pulitikong tumulong sa iyong pamilya?
Annex E (Interview for KBL and other Financial Assistance Programs Recipients)

Interview Guide for Medical, KBL and other Financial Assistance Recipients

Pangalan (optional):
Edad:
Kasarian:
Trabaho: nananahi sa bahay
Bilang ng anak:
Kininika ng pamilya buwan-buwan:
Taon huling nakahingi ng tulong-medikal sa Kongresista/Senador:
Taon huling bumoto:
Sino ang pulitiko:

1) Bakit mo kinailangang humingi ng tulong mula sa mga pulitiko? Para kanino ang hiningi mong tulong?
2) Maaari mo bang ilarawan ang proseso ng pagkuha ng financial assistance mula sa mga pulitiko? Saan mo una naisip na humingi ng tulong noong mangyari ang insidente?
3) Paano mo napag-alamang posible ang paghingi ng tulong mula sa mga opisina ng iba’t-ibang pulitiko? Paano mo napiling humingi sa naturang pulitikong iyon? Saan ka unang humingi ng tulong?
4) Ano ang naramdaman mo nang makuha mo ang guarantee letter o ang tulong mula sa opisina ng pulitiko?
5) Sa iyong paningin, gaano kalaki ang naging tulong ng financial assistance sa inyong pinaggastusan?
6) Kung wala ang inabot na tulong mula sa naturang pulitiko, saan po kayo sumubok humingi pa ng tulong?
7) May iba ba kayong nilabas sa sariling bulsa?
8) Sa tingin mo ba ay dapat ituloy ang mga ganitong programa?
9) Sa iyong pananaw, maaari mo bang timbangin kung paano ginagampanan ng pulitiko ang kanyang responsibilidad?
10) Noong hindi ka pa nakakahingi ng tulong, ano ang pagtingin mo sa paggampan ng responsibilidad ng naturang pulitiko? Nagbago ba ito?
11) Ano ang dahilan kung bakit naging positibo/negatibo ang iyong pananaw ukol sa naturang kongresista? (maaaring sumagot nang higit sa isa)
12) Binoto mo ba ang pulitikong tumulong sa iyong pamilya?
13) Bakit mo napagdesisyunang iboto ang naturang pulitiko?
14) May papel ba ang pagtanggap mo ng tulong sa iyong naging desisyong iboto siya? Gaano kalaki ang papel ng pagtanggap mo ng tulong sa naging desisyon mo na iboto siya?
15) Anu-ano ang iba pa ang mga naging salik sa iyong pagdedesisyon na iboto siya?
16) Masasabi mo bang tumanaw ka ng utang na loob sa pulitikong tumulong sa iyong pamilya?
Annex F (Transcript of all Interviews)

Expert Interview: Sir Raymond Palatino (March 10, 2015)


Psalm: Maikling tanong lang po, ibig po bang sabihin, halimbawa doon sa 200M na binigay sa Senator, kung ano po yung sa hard, sa hard lang po talaga? Di po ba matatransfer sa pagiging soft?

Cong. Palatino: Actually pwede na yung buong 200M mo ay hard, pero kukunin mo siya sa hard ng ibang Senator. Makikipag-swap ka nga. Pwede rin halimbawa may ginagawa yung ibang Senator, di ba may hospital fund na soft, maari mo tanungin. E Paano kaya nagdidistribute si Senator? At least si Congressman, per district siya, kilala niya iyong mga pasyente niya, e paano si Senator? Yung ginagawa ng ibang Senator, binibiligay niya sa
mga Mayor o ibang mga Congressman din. Ano yun, partnership, di ba? Nakakapagbigay siya ng pera, at the same time nagkakaroon ng *utang na loob* yung mayor o Congressman.

Psalm: So parang sa loob po ng gobyerno parang may.. parang patron-client relationship.


Psalm: Sa inyong obserbasyon, ano yung pinakapatok sa mga Senador na soft projects lang po siguro?


Psalm: Ano po yung specific?


Psalm: Either classroom po o kalsada talaga.


Psalm: Sige po. Kung halimbawa po mamamayan ako na gusto ng humingi kay Congressman o Senator, paano po ‘yung proseso ng paghingi po sa kanila?


Psalm: Bali po sir, ibig niyo po sabihin, kung hindi po maaccess ng mamamayan yung opisina, karaniwan na siya makakaaccess.

Psalm: Homogenous po ba sir na hindi po proactive ang mga Congressman. Halimbawa po, side question lang, kayo po sa Makabayan bloc, paano ang paggamit niyo ng Pork Barrel po?

Cong. Palatino: Ok, yung first part muna ng tanong, lahat ba ay ganyan ang ginagawa? Kung sa district Congressman yan, mayroon silang mga machinery, mayroon silang tao sa mga bawat barangay, coordinator. So yung mga tao lalapit sa coordinator bago kay Congressman. Bihira yung Congressman na may general plan na balak abutin ang nangangailangan. Usually ang kanyang criteria for distribution, hindi doon sa who needs the money, parang ano yung may high impact? Ano yung may political impact? Or to be crude, or to be candid, sino yung makakapgbigay ng pinakaraming boto, o political support?

Cong. Palatino: Second part of your question kaming Makabayan. Kasi kami from the start, binubuo kami ng mga marginalized groups from the grassroots. So, ah, yung mga chapters naming mayroon nang mga request, at doon yung aming paraan ng pagbibigay... Kung bigyan kami ng pondong halimbawa during my first term wala akong pork barrel kasi minority. Second term naming, first two years lang, after nun wala na. Hindi rin naming na-improve yung set-up. Siyempre yung first year mo aaralin mo yung system, second year mo paano mo siya maiimprove pa e di ka naman nabigyan. Pero kami nagcontribute kami sa public schools at tsaka hospital.

Psalm: Bali hindi po automatic na hindi lahat ng miyembro ng Kongreso ay mayroon?


Psalm: Dahil napunta na rin po tayo sa discretionary, yung kunwari pong nagsaswap yung mga district congressman ng pork barrel, hindi po ba siya lumalabag? May research po kasi ako na nabasa, halimbawa yung mga Senador, may concentration sila ng pork barrel (halimbawa Jinggoy Manila), wala po bang nakasaad na rule na dapat..


Psalm: Mayroon po ba kayong impormasyon sa kung anong lugar ang mga iyon?

Cong. Palatino: Pwede mo nay an i-google, alam mo nay ng Manila, batanes yung kay Abad. Urban centers kung saan may voting population.
Psalm: Sabi niyo po sir yung pinakamarhinalisadong sektor ng lipunan ay hindi po natutulungan ng Pork Barrel dahil discretionary nga siya.

Cong. Palatino: Natutulungan yung mga marginalized, pero hindi lahat.

Psalm: Opo. Doon po sa mga maswerteng nakakthingi o may koneksyon, sa tingin niyo po ba nakakaapekto po po ba may epekto doon yun sa voting behavior ng mga mamamayan?


Kasi dapat wala tayong utang na loob sa kanila, kasi di naman nila pera yun. Oo sila nagdistribute, pero dapat ministerial nga lahat yun. The idea of social Welfare, kung sino ang may kailangan, you can access it. At wala nang pakialam kung malakas o mahina ka sa nagbibigay. Kasi, sa totoo lang subject to condition yung pagbibigay ng pera sa kanila. Parang may unwritten agreement. I’ll give you money pero sa politika natin, kailangan makaalaid mo. Masyadong personalistic ang relationship. The idea is, if you’re sick and you need healthcare, you go to the hospital diba, and health workers, not to the district Congressman. If you need scholarship, mag-apply ka. At kailangan yung scholarship fund available to all, kumbaga parang competitive application. Lalo na elementary highschool e. Karapatan yan, dapat libre yan. Sa kolehiyo, competitive nga. Kung sino dapat ang may karapatan mag-aral. I mean, lahat naman tayo may karapatan mag-aral pero iba yung kolehiyo e. Gusto natin libre yan, pero limited yung slot. Dapat yung scholarship dapat yung kailangan ng bansa. Di dapat yung scholar ni Congressman. Maraming matalino pero walang opportunity.

Psalm: Ano po kaya ang mas nagagamit ng mga pulitiko para magestablish ng personalistic relationship sa mga tao? Yung hard po ba o soft? Parang relatively, ano po yung mas nagagamit?


Psalm: Kumbaga mas malapit po yung isa, yung soft project po?

Cong. Palatino: Para sa akin, oo.

Psalm: Sir diba po kayo ay may mga koneksyon din sa grassroots, Yung mga natutulungan ng Senador o Kongresista, diba po may Napoles scam, mayroon po ba kayong impormasyon o balita sa kung ano ang tanaw nila sa pagbabasura sa Pork barel? Kung pabor po ba sila o hindi?

na pag kailangan mo ng serbisyo dun ka sa pulitiko pupunta hindi roon sa hospital. So kailangan niyo ipaliwanag, pero kabib ipaliwanag hindi nila ganoon ka naiintindihan.

Psalm: Ibig niyo po ba sabihin, bagama’t dineklara na siyang unconstitutional noong 2014, mayroon pa po bang mga lumalapit pa po ba na nagpapakita ng hinaing na di sila natutulungan?


Psalm: Dahil na wala na po yung teknikal na PDAF, dahil po malalim din po yung kaalaman ninyo sa sistema ng budgeting ng Kongreso, totoo po ban a wala na ang pork barrel at kung hindi po nasaan po siya ngayon?

Cong. Palatino: Embedded in the national budget. Maliciously embedded in the budget to be used under a different category pero for the same partisan political use. Essentially pork barrel. Pinakapakita yan nung expose ni Tino, yung recording. Nagkaroon talaga ng lituhan sa ospital yung mga hospital administrators ineexpect nila na sila na hahawak ng pondong

Psalm: Nabalitaan ko po kasi sir nag pilot study po ako sa ibang mamamayan. Ang sabi po nila, possible pa po na makahingi ng tulong sa mga congressman kaya lang di direktang inaabort ang era?


Psalm: Bali sa ngayon po mayroon pa rin po?

Cong. Palatino: Mayroon, pero parang ano na siya. The budget which cannot be named. It who cannot be named, ganun ang structure ng pork barrel, pero andyan, it exists.

Psalm: Mayroon pa pong some kind of?

Cong. Palatino: Di lang some kind talagang mayroon, as exposed by Makabayan legislators, si Miriam nga rin diba may pinakita siyang list or form pala?

Psalm: Bali huling tanong lang po sir, kung kayo lang po ang tatanungin, sa opinion niyo, ano po yung nararapat gawin sa pork barrel upang matanggal natin yung personalistic na patron-client na nangyayari?

Cong. Palatino: Overhaul the budget system. Yung budget system natin Marcos legacy. Ibig sabihin, walang power of the purse ang Congress. Naalala mo few years ago si Obama di siya nagkasundo with Congress nag shutdown yung federal government? It will never happen in the Philippines kasi rubberstamp, kung ano yung gusto ng Presidente ala-Marcos masusunod. The budget system is not democratized. And then yung accountability and monitoring natin di malakas check and balance natin e, kasi wala tayong independent
Congress. Yung mga NGOs natin na coco-Sopt ng ibang mga budget programs. Transparency? Sabi ko nga, you should not equate transparency with the posting of materials online. What is the, tactics is to bombard us with too much information. Napoles papers are all OK, but she was fake. Overhaul the budget system, the budget measures, strengthen yung accountability measures, citizen participation i-enhance.

Psalm: Last lang po sir, maihahantulad niyo po ba yung pork barrel nung nakaraang taon bilang vote-buying mechanism na nagagamit ng mga politiko?

Oo, vote-buying talaga siya. Although it is the scientific name of vote-buying. Priority Development Assistance Fund. Di lang vote-buying kasi vote-buying eleksyon lang yan. Ito na ang ano e, best example ng political patronage and partisan politics. At anong klaseng democracy mayroon tayo e- pork-controlled democracy, pork-fueled bureaucracy.

Psalm: Maraming salamat po Sir!
E-mailed Expert Interview Response: Social Watch Philippines

Psalm: Anu-anong mga iba’t-ibang porma ng paggamit ng mga Senador/Kongresista sa kanilang PDAF?

SWS: It was in the 2005 GAA when the government introduced the “program menu concept”. The program menu is “a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority”.¹ This was adopted eventually in the 2006 (re-enacted from 2005 GAA) 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 GAAs. The menu contains the following program/projects identified by lawmakers, expressed in PDAF special provision.²

SWS: The 2011 GAA modified the classification and distribution of PDAF allocation. PDAF allocation covers two components, i.e., soft and hard projects, allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. According to the Department of Budget and Management, “Soft” projects, in general, pertain to the delivery of social services to citizens. These include scholarships, medical assistance, training, small infrastructure programs among others. “Hard” projects are usually infrastructure projects, including local roads and bridges, flood control, among others. The PDAF allocation per senator (and the Vice President) is P200 million (P100 million each for “hard” and “soft” projects nationwide). Each congressman or party-list representative is allocated P70 million (P40 million “hard’ and P30 million “soft”) that will be implemented in their respective districts for their constituents.³ The 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAA adopted the program menu concept, providing more specifics for the menu of PDAF projects that can be funded and implemented by respective agencies.⁴

Psalm: Maaari ka bang magbigay ng mga halimbawa ng mga Senador/Kongresista gamit ang pork barrel?

SWS: (See response to Item 1 re: Soft projects)

SWS: As mentioned above, the menu of PDAF projects have been fleshed out by 2011. In the last GAA to provide for the allocation for PDAF, you may look at Special Provision 1 of the RA 10352 for the list of “priority programs and projects chargeable against soft allocation.”⁵ It should be noted that small infrastructure programs (e.g. day care centers, multi-purpose buildings, rural health units) are considered as “soft projects” for as long as they are implemented by agencies other than the DPWH. Hence, all PDAF projects

² Special Provision 1, Article L, RA 9336 (2005 PDAF Article), as cited in Belgica vs. Executive Secretary
⁵ Ibid.
implemented by DPWH are considered as “hard projects”.

Psalm: Paano ang proseso ng pag-aabot ng tulong ng mga Senador/Kongresista sa mga benefisaryo ng PDAF?

SWS: The PDAF is a lump sum item, lodged as a special purpose fund (SPF), in the national budget. According to DBM, as a SPF, “the process of identifying the specific projects by the legislators happens only during the Budget Execution phase⁶, or Post-enactment phase as called by the Supreme Court. ” The study made by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) on the flow of pork (PDAF) clearly illustrated how PDAF funds would reach intended beneficiaries (Read PCIJ’s “The Flow of Pork” for details).⁷ The NGOs and POs can also request legislators to fund certain projects through PDAF. The funds will be channeled to the appropriate agency or LGU to implement proposed projects.⁸

Psalm: Noong hindi pa idineklara ang Pork Barrel bilang labag sa konstitusyon, totoo bang maaaring maglaan ng PDAF ang isang kongresista sa isang distritong hindi niya sakop?

SWS: There were no set rules for lodging PDAF projects outside legislators’ districts until 2011. From 2012 to 2013, the DBM released guidelines that explicitly allowed allocating PDAF funds outside congressional jurisdiction, provided that the concerned “district representative shall have a written concurrence of the recipient/beneficiary legislative district”. Other restrictions that were established in 2013 include 1) exemption of assistance to indigent patients and scholarships from authorized programs/projects and 2) the need for endorsement by the House Speaker. This was reflected into DBM National Budget Circulars (NBC) 537 Item 2.4 & 547 Item 2.3 pertaining to Guidelines on the Release of Funds chargeable against Priority Development Assistance Fund. Such provision was eventually enacted into law through the 2013 GAA.

Psalm: Ano ang karaniwang batayan ng isang pulitiko sa pag dedesisyon kung saang programa at anong lugar niya ilalaan ang kanyang PDAF?

SWS: The project menu provides some restriction with regard to the types of PDAF projects selected. It also sets conditions for downloading of funds and subsequent project implementation through a list of requirements.⁹ But irregularities emerge because of the level of discretion afforded to legislators in terms of project identification. The politicians’

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⁶ Department of Budget and Management, op. cit.
⁹ Special Provision 1, Article XLIV, RA 10352 (2013 PDAF Article), op. cit.
bailiwicks, which are not necessarily the poorest towns, usually benefit from pork.\textsuperscript{10}

SWS: Nonetheless, there are some legislators who listened to their constituents’ voices through public consultations as to what among the various requested projects in respective districts should be prioritized. In those cases, the communities are empowered because their citizens understand the budget process, have access to information, are part of deciding how PDAF funds should be used and are equipped on how to monitor fund utilization.\textsuperscript{11}

SWS: But it does not change the fact that PDAF distorts and blurs the constitutional definition of what the roles of the legislator and executive are. The job of legislators is not to implement projects. Their constitutional mandate is to enact laws.\textsuperscript{12} Implementation of projects in the local areas are not the responsibility of lawmakers, it is an executive function.\textsuperscript{13}

Psalm: Sa inyong pananaw, nakaaapekto ba ang PDAF assistance sa voting behavior ng mga nakatatangap nito?

SWS: The preponderance of PDAF-funded infrastructure projects in politicians’ bailiwicks creates an impression among legislators’ constituents that progress occurred in their localities, which is easily attributable to their lawmakers. Financial assistance, when recipients are selected arbitrarily, strengthens the ties between the legislator and the beneficiary. As a result, this may elicit name-recall and desirability for the incumbent.

Psalm: Mayroon ka bang impormasyon ukol sa saloobin ng mga katanggap ng PDAF ukol sa ikinakasang batas upang isabasura ang Pork Barrel?

SWS: Please coordinate with Ms. Inday Espina Varona of Scrap Pork Network regarding this question.

Psalm: Sa pagkawala ng PDAF, mawawala na rin kaya ang suporta ng mga benepisaryo ng PDAF sa mga kongresista/senador na tumulong sa kanila?

SWS: While PDAF was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, it does not mean that the pork barrel system is already abolished. A new system of providing pork-like funds has been installed, in such a way that legislators submit their list of proposals and recipients to respective departments/agencies during budget preparation phase for integration in the agency-proposed budgets (More on this in #10). This way, legislators can still look after


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12} Cantos, J. op cit.

\textsuperscript{13} Social Watch Philippines, op. cit.
the needs of their constituents, only that accountability now resides with the
departments/agencies. PDAF beneficiaries continue to receive the benefits and assistance
and legislators can still intervene in the conduct of project identification and
implementation. Only that this time, it is not named PDAF.

SWS: However, for PDAF already downloaded to the LGUs but are not yet disbursed after
the Supreme decision on PDAF, the LGUs are not touching the funds. They are waiting
the decision of the DBM and COA. With the rule of SC that all pork barrel in previous
years are considered unconstitutional, there may be chances that all unspent PDAF will be
returned to the national treasury. There will be problems in LGUs which frontloaded funds
for PDAF projects already committed by legislators and are halfway into completion such
as buildings.14

Psalm: Sapat na ba ang Supreme Court decision upang tanggali ng lahat ng porna ng
PDAF? May iba pa bang mga porna ng discretionary funds sa alinmang ahensiya ng
gobyerno na maaaring magdulot ng parehong epekto gaya ng sa PDAF?

SWS: Social Watch Philippines (SWP) welcomed the favorable Supreme Court decision
on PDAF but we believe that the legislative pork barrel is merely a small portion of a bigger
lump sum fund, i.e. special purpose funds (SPFs), which are under the discretion of the
executive.

SWS: According to the DBM, SPFs are allocations in the national budget allocated for
specific purposes, which are lump sum in nature.15 These are not as detailed and specific
as the budget proposals of regular agencies and are not subjected to rigorous congressional
scrutiny. Once these are approved, they are vulnerable to reductions, transfers, and
‘adjustments’. Not only that SPFs have always been problematic, but since these are not
as detailed as regular appropriations, they tend to be vulnerable to abuse. Accountability is
sometimes difficult to establish and documentation likewise difficult to carry out.

SWS: For 2013 (the last time PDAF appeared in the GAA), PhP267.925 billion has been
approved as SPFs along with Ph117.548 billion as unprogrammed funds, for a total of
PhP385.473 billion. The PDAF budget level of PhP24.790 Billion was just around 9.25
percent of the SPF which was approved at PhP267.925 Billion. In terms of magnitude, the
size of SPFs has consistently grown in the last two years, reaching just below P400 billion
levels. Some big-ticket lump sum items in the SPFs posted huge increases during the 2-
year period. For 2015, PhP368.729 billion has been approved as SPFs along with
Ph123.056 billion as unprogrammed funds, for a total of PhP491.785 billion.

SWS: Nonetheless, while already voided in 2013, the practice of legislators identifying

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14 Cantos, J. op cit.
15 Department of Budget and Management (2013). A Brief on the Special Purpose Funds in the National Budget.
Retrieved at http://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/DAP/Note%20on%20the%20Special%20Purpose%20Funds%20
Released%20-%20Oct%202013 .pdf
projects in the budgets of respective agencies continues to take place today. As originally proposed by the Executive in 2014, the budget included P25 billion PDAF. The Congress removed the PDAF budget item. Instead, the legislators identified the projects and agencies through which the PDAF was channeled. These were included in the GAA as line budget items under implementing agencies such as Department of Health (DOH), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Commission on Higher Education (CHED), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) with attached agency, Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), and Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), with the fund already “reserved” for congressmen.

SWS: This year, SWP found PDAF-like funds in the budget, amounting to P46.169 billion in the approved 2015 GAA, which are lodged in the approved budgets of the aforementioned departments and agencies. Agency heads now accommodate recommendations from legislators in terms of programs/projects and beneficiaries, even during budget preparation. In effect, each solon may receive more than the previously fixed allocation of P70 or P200 billion per legislator. This practice can still be able to perpetuate the pork barrel system.

SWS: Another source of discretionary fund is the arbitrary pooling and use of government savings via the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), which for has accumulated a total amount of P144 billion in two years (2011-2013). According to the government, the DAP is a “stimulus package” aimed at pump-priming the economy through programs and projects financed through savings and windfall revenues. This spending mechanism was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on four grounds (reduced to three in the modified decision). But because of the relaxed redefinition of savings in the 2015 GAA, it might make the SC ruling on DAP inapplicable.

SWS: SWP believes there is more reason to scrutinize these funds because SPFs are not detailed and these can be transferred easily; and power to transfer funds was gravely abused during the previous administration and was implemented by the incumbent’s use of illegitimate savings through the unconstitutional DAP. Since the Executive holds these huge funds, it can get lawmakers to act upon certain legislative measures or other Executive-sponsored actions that needed Congress’ approval.

SWS: Overall, the citizens should be watchful because pork-like mechanisms similar to PDAF and other discretionary, lump sum funds can be resurrected in other forms.

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16 Cantos, J. op cit.
20 General Provision Secs. 69-71, RA 10362 (2015 General Appropriations Act)
**Subject Interview: Respondent 1 (February 27, 2015)**

Psalm: May trabaho po ba kayo?

Respondent 1: Public School teacher

Psalm: May anak po?

Respondent 1: Tatlo.

Psalm: Magkano ang kinikita buwan-buwan.


Psalm: Botante po kayo?

Respondent 1: Dalawang eleksyon na ako di nakakaboto kasi nagseserve ako tuwing eleksyon e.

Psalm: Ano po yung dahilan ng paghingi niyo ng tulong?

Respondent 1: Ano. Chemotherapy at breast cancer.

Psalm: Bali pwede nyo po ba ikwento yung proseso ng paghingi nyo ng financial assistance?


Psalm: Ano pong specific na opisina yung napuntahan niyo?

Respondent 1: Si recom echiverri po.

Psalm: Office niya. Diba congressman siya ngayon? Ay anong district po ng Caloocan? O siya lang po ang Congressman?


Psalm: Ay kayo po saan po kayo nakatira.

Respondent 1: Sa Bagong Silang ako nagtuturo sa North Caloocan. Pero doon ako nakatira kumuha ako ng housing sa San Jose del monte bulacan parang doon ako umuuwi. Bali pagbigay nyo po ng certificate s, pumunpta kayong Congress.

Psalm: Oo Pagkatapos ng interview saan kayo pumupunta?

Respondent 1: Sa DSWD pila rin kami dun. Dinala nila yung papel naming. Sila na nagdala

Psalm: Mayroon po bang guarantee letter?
Respondent 1: Wala. Pinapirama lang kami, may listahan lang ng mga kumuha ng pera. Pirma kami

Psalm: Tapos pag punta nyo po sa DSWD. Lalabas na po yung?

Respondent 1: Yun na yun, sila ang nagrerelease.

Psalm: Bali di po ba kayo pwede pumunta sa DSWD?

Respondent 1: Hindi. Kala ko nga doon ako bibigyan e, dadalhin pala sa DSWD.

Psalm: Pero lahat ng interview sa opisina?

Respondent 1: Oo.

Psalm: Bali isang beses lang po talaga kayo nakahingi o parang tuloy-tuloy po siya?

Respondent 1: Isa lang. di na ako bumalik kasi pila doon eh. Mahirap e.

Psalm: Paano niyo po nalaman na pwede pala humingi ng tulong doon?

Respondent 1: Sabi ng mga officemate kong iba. May medical assistance daw kasi doon.

Psalm: Kailan po kayo umingi?

Respondent 1: Mga end ng October. Yun yung unang chemo ko e. 2014.

Psalm: Yung nakuha niyo lang po ay 2000?

Respondent 1: Sabi kasi nila aabot kasi ng 10,000 e. pamasahlang pala.

Psalm: Sa tingin niyo po ba malaki po ang tulong sa inyo?

Respondent 1: Maliit lang kasi pamasahae at pagkain lang yun e, pero malaking tulong na rin

Psalm: Mayroon pa po ba kayong ibang institusyon o mga tao na hiningan ng tulong?


Psalm: Diba naging mayor po siya dati?

Respondent 1: Vice-mayor. Ngayon si Oca Malapitan na e. At ang vice niya si Maca.

Psalm: Ah yun po financial assistance sa scholarship naman

Respondent 1: Oo nung nagtithesis ako sa MA. Nagbigay ng 500.

Psalm: Yun pong binigay sa inyo di po siya galing sa PDAF?


Psalm: Dapat tanggalin na o ayusin lang?


Psalm: Nung lumabas ung balita, nag-iba ba yung pananaw mo sa mga pulitiko?


Psalm: Punta po tayo dun sa pananaw po ninyo, diba po sabi niyo naging negatibo yung pagtingin ninyo. Pero si Recom o si Egay, isa rin ba sila sa mga pulitiko na nakinabang?


Psalm: Di po kayo nakaboto noong 2010, 2013?

Respondent 1: Hindi e.

Psalm: Naabutan niyo po bang tumatahko si Egay Erice o si Recom Echiverri?


Psalm: Noong tumatahko sila nakaboto po ba kayo?

Respondent 1: Oo.

Psalm: Nung mga panahong iyon binoto niyo po ba yung mga nakatulong sa inyo?
Respondent 1: Binoto ko naman siya kasi marami siyang nagawa sa lugar, marami silang napagandang mga pathwalk dati butas-butas ngayon may mga gate niya, napaganda niya rin yung lugar.

Psalm: Kaya lang nag-iba po?

Respondent 1: Pero may positive din, may negative din.

Psalm: Kunwari po sa hinaharap, magkakaroon po ba ng papel yung pagtanggap niyo ng tulong sa magiging boto ninyo?


Psalm: Diba natulungan po kayo sa DSWD, kung bibigyan po kayo ng pagkakataon sa tingin niyo po ba iboboto niyo po ulit si Recom halimbawa tumakbo siya ulit sa Caloocan na mayor?

Psalm: Bali sa hinaharap po, yung pagtanggap niyo ng tulong, hindi po makakaapekto kahit kaunti lang?

Respondent 1: Hindi, oo hindi, walang epekto yun. Noong Congressman siya dati nakahingi din ako, may oral yata kami noon, pero doon din kami nakahingi sa DSWD.

Psalm: Bali hindi niyo sa gagamtnin na ano noh?

Respondent 1: Hindi, na parang gamitin ko siya para lang makahingi ako ng.

Psalm: O parang bilang pagtanaw lang ng *utang na loob* bilang tumulong sila.

Respondent 1: Hindi, kasi hindi naman nila pera yun e. Inisip ko pera naman ng bayan yun e.

[family member approaches]

Psalm: Huling tanong na lang po, kung mayroon po kayong mairerekomenda bilang isang titser o mamamayan, sa sistema nila ng pagtulong nila sa mahihirap?

Respondent 1: Mas maganda na direkta nila tingnan yung sitwasyon ng tao. Wag nang idaan sa sinu-sino. Kasi tingin ko, pag idaan mo ditto may cut pag daan mo ditto may cut ult wala nang napupunta sa mahihirap. Wala na, kawawa yung mahihirap. Kaya mas maganda sila na mismo pumunta doon makita nila yung sitwasyon ng personal. Walang mangyayari kasi di naman nila alam yun problema ng tao dun. Magbigay sila doon may...


Psalm: Dapat po ba ayusin ang PDAF na sistema o tanggaling na lang at ibigay sa eskwelahan?


Bali yun na lang po, salamat ate. Medyo nag 20 minutes po tayo.

[end]
Subject Interview: Respondent 2 (February 27, 2015)

Psalm: Ano pong pangalan niyo po.
Respondent 2: [name omitted]
Psalm: Edad po?
Respondent 2: 51
Psalm: May trabaho po ba kayo? Trabaho po.
Psalm: May anak po ba sila? Ilan po?
Psalm: Magkano po kita niyo buwan-buwan.
Psalm: Kayo po ba ay botante? Kailan po ang huling pagboto niyo?
Respondent 2: Yung huli ko kasing boto sa Malabon.
Psalm: Noong 2013 senatorial nakaboto po kayo?
Psalm: Nung Presidential eleksyon 2010 po nakaboto po kayo?
Respondent 2: Hindi rin, ay nakaboto yata ako sa Malabon yun.
Psalm: Ano po yung dahilan ng npaghingi nila ng tuong sa Senador?
Psalm: Yung sa PCSO ano po yung hiningi niyo?
Respondent 2: Para sa radiation.
Psalm: Bali naalala niyo po ba kung paano yung proseso ng paghingi ng tulong?
Psalm: Bali ilang beses ka nakahingi ng tulong?
Respondent 2: Yun lang pong isang beses.
Psalm: Sa tingin niyo po ba malaki po yung tulong na naibigay sa inyo?
Respondent 2: Oo, malaki talaga.
Psalm: Mayroon pa po ba kayong nahingian na iba bukod kay Honasan?
Respondent 2: Wala na naman.
Psalm: Nabalitaan niyo po ba yung balita ng PDAF scam yung pagananakaw?
Psalm: Bali kung kayo lang ang tatanungin, gusto niyo bang tanggalin ang PDAF o palitan lang yung mga mali?
Psalm: Noong narinig niyo po yung balita, ang sabi niyo po kanina hindi kayo naniniwala na si Gringo ay isa sa mga kurap na politiko?
Respondent 2: Hindi ko lang masabi talaga e, hindi ako sigurado.
Psalm: Kailan po kayo nakahingi ng tulong, anong taon po yun?
Respondent 2: June, 2011. Sa PCSO. Tapos 2013 ako nakasimula ng radiation
Psalm: Ah matagal na po kayong nagpapagamot. Doon po kayo nagsimulang ma diagnose ano? Pagkatapos po ba ng radiation kayo nakahingi o bago pa po magsimula? Bali bago po kayo magpa chemo, doon po kayo lumapit kay Senator Gringo ano?
Respondent 2: Oo, mayroon na akong papeles noon e.
Respondent 2: Oo, nauna yung chemo. Humingi ako ng tulong kasi di ako makakapagsimula ng radiation
Respondent 2: Oo.
Psalm: May papel po ba o naging factor yung pagtanggap niyo ng tulong sa magiging boto niyo sa hinaharap.
Respondent 2: Oo.
Psalm: Bukod po sa pagtulong, may iba pa po ba kayong positibong bagay na nakikita kay Gringo.

Respondent 2: Wala na namang iba.

Psalm: Yun lang po ba yung tanging salik o factor sa pagboto niyo?

Respondent 2: Ano yung salik?

Psalm: Factor po.

Respondent 2: Tinatagalog mo kasi e [laughs]


Psalm: Masasabi niyo po ban a may tinaw kayo na utang na loob sa tumulong sa inyo?

Respondent 2: Oo naman, kasi natulungan din ako.
Subject Interview: Respondent Three (April 07, 2015)

Psalm: Ah ilang taon na po kayo lola?
Respondent 2: 64 years old.

Psalm: Pwede ko po ba malaman kung ilan ang bilang ng anak niyo po?
Respondent 2: Pito.

Psalm: Tinitirhan?
Respondent 2: Sa Laguna.

Psalm: May trabaho po?

Psalm: Bali yung kinkita ng pamilya niyo ngayon san po kayo nakabase? Mayroon po ba kayong pensiyon na nakukuha?
Respondent 2: Kaunti lang ang pensiyon ko, P2,400 bawat buwan.

Psalm: Natatandaan niyo po ba kalian kayo uling nakakuha ng medical assistance sa pulitiko,

Psalm: Sino po ang ibang pulitiko na nahingan ninyo ng tulong?
[Public Announcement system calls patient]
Psalm: Ay sige po ok lang po na huminto.
Respondent 2: De baka maantala ka e.

Psalm: Sino po ang mga pulitiko na nahingan niyo ng tulong?
Respondent 2: Mayor Remante, Tapos si Ivy Araullo, yung Congresswoman. Tapos yung Estregan ang apilido?

Psalm: A si George Estregan po, yung gobernador ng Laguna.
Respondent 2: Ayun yung governor ng Laguna. Yung lumabas sa Asiong
Psalm: Hanapin ko na lang po. Sa nasyunal po mayroon po kayong nahingan?
Respondent 2: Wala.

Psalm: Tanong ko lang po bakit kinailangan niyo humingi? Ano po yung dahilan
Respondent 2: Kasi ang pagpapagamot niya sa doctor, ayan may findings yung doctor, yun nga natubuan daw ng laman sa spinal. Tapos yung pagpapagamot pa niya, ano naman daw,
yung cancer of the spine. Tapos yung ibang proseso naman, lumabas na, ano ba iyon, basta may findings yung doctor na lung cancer. Pero sabi ng Doctor yung sa bato niya lumiliti. Basta nilalagnat at nahihirapan huminga.

Psalm: Bali nong nalaman niyo po yung diagnosis, ano po yung ginawa niyo para makahingi ng financial assistance sa pulitiko?

Respondent 2: Lumapit po kami sa social service para mabigyan ng, ano nga, kung wala kaming dalang documents at tsaka yung mga, tawag dito, mga report, MRI, laboratory, tapos dapat naka attached. Hiningian kami ng certificate of indigency sa barangay.

Psalm: Doon po sa opisina nina Mayor Remante, ano po ang kailangan?


Psalm: Noong nalaman niyo po na may sakit ang anak ninyo, saan niyo naisip humingi ng tulong?

Respondent 2: Sariling bulsa lang, tapos pag kulang sa Congressman na talaga.

Psalm: Paano niyo po napagalaman na posible pala makahingi ng tulong?

Respondent 2: Yung mga kasama naming ditto nagpacheck-up, yung mga kasamahan naming sa San Pablo. Nagsabi sila na a may tulong diya apply tayo sa ganito. Kung saan saan ako nakakapunta, umabot nga ako sa Sta. Cruz, Laguna sa gobernador inaabot kami ng medaling araw.

Psalm: Sa katayuan po ng pamilya ninyo, gaano po kalaki yung ganoong klase ng tulong na binibigay ng pulitiko?


Psalm: Tuwing nakakahingi po kayo ng tulong, ano ang nararamdaman ninyo?

Respondent 2: Masaya siyempre kasi kahit papaano nadudugtungan yung pagpapagamot.

Psalm: Halimbawa pong di kayo nakakahingi sa pulitiko, saan po kayo kukuha ng panggastos?


Psalm: Humingi pa po ba kayo ng tulong sa kamag-anak noong nakakahingi na kayo sa pulitiko?

Respondent 2: Hindi na. wala na akong hiningian.

Psalm: Bukod sa hiningi ninyo, may nilabas pa ba kayong iba?
Respondent 2: Si ate [name omitted] pala, nagchat siya sa mga dati niyang classmate pinapadalhan siya.

Psalm: Pero sa sarili niyo pong income, may nilabas po kayo?

Respondent 2: Sa pagkain lang namin.

Psalm: Sa tingin po ba ninyo yung ganoong programa ng politiko dapat ituloy?

Respondent 2: Ito nga di na siya napagpachemo kasi sabi nila nawala. Importante rin ituloy.

Psalm: Sa kalakhan po, gaano po kaganda o kapangit sa tingin niyo ang pamamalakad ni Mayor Remante?


Psalm: Sa tingin niyo po ba, yung pag abot nila ng tulong sa pamilya, nakaapekto po kaya yun sa kagandahan ng pagtingin ninyo sa serbisyo niya?

Respondent 2: Kaya nga matagal na siyang mayor, kasi maganda talga pamamalakad niya. Tulad nitong ambulansa, libre. Minsan sampu, minsan bente.

Psalm: Tanong ko lang po kung nakaboto kayo nung 2013 senatorial? Si Mayor Remante po ba nakaupo pa po ba?

Respondent 2: Yung anak na niya nakaupo.

[Doctor calls subject]


[Interview continues without recording]
Sample Recommendation Letter for Medical Assistance Recipients (name and address of recipient omitted because of ethical considerations. Photo was voluntarily given to the researcher by a subject interviewee
Aside from delivering soft projects, politicians in Paranaque are also active in building hard projects that are creatively named to elicit name recall. Here, we can see that an open gymnasium in Sun Valley is named after the political dynasty Golez. The word “Golezeum” is a portmanteau of the surname Golez and coliseum. This manifests how politicians are truly active in using government funds for political ends i.e. name recall.
One of the alleys in Barangay Sun Valley pictured above. Sun Valley is a poor community primarily composed of informal settling communities. There are relatively well-off families, but most of the barangay are minimum-wage earners.

One of the entrances to Barangay Sun Valley in Paranaque City. A signpost stating “Welcome Gus Tambunting” is seen. Gus Tambunting, the incumbent Congressman of the 2nd District of Paranaque, is active in delivering KBL and other financial assistance programs.